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ABSTRACT 
A federal regulation states that immigration hearings shall be 
open to the public. Courts and scholars also have located a right to 
observe these proceedings in the First Amendment. And yet 
immigration judges (IJ) have excluded members of the press and 
other observers from hearings for no stated legal reasons, thus 
effectively eliminating public scrutiny of proceedings that affect 
millions of citizens and non-citizens in the United States. In 
response to a lawsuit pursuing monetary, injunctive, and 
declaratory relief after an IJ ordered guards to remove a reporter 
from a federal building, an Eleventh Circuit panel held IJs have 
absolute judicial immunity against litigation brought by observers. 
This Article highlights legal errors in the Panel holding of this case 
of first impression. The Article analyzes the legislative history of 
policies on contempt powers and Congress’s limits on IJ powers, as 
well as offers quantitative and qualitative findings on the efficacy 
of internal agency misconduct complaint investigations. The 
statutory nature of IJ powers and the absence of any remedy for 
damages caused by conduct in excess of legal functions suggest a 
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[A]lthough I agree that on this record IJ Cassidy is entitled to 
judicial immunity, I am concerned about the question of 
Professor Stevens’ remedy for his conduct . . . The majority does 
not address the personal, non-judicial reasons that allegedly 
motivated IJ Cassidy to remove Professor Stevens from the 
building and that involved nearly the entire apparatus of the 
EOIR. Though they acknowledge that ‘Plaintiff had published 
criticisms of deportation proceedings in general and of 
Immigration Judge William Cassidy’s performance in 
particular,’ they fail to mention that based on these criticisms—
including a piece that denounced IJ Cassidy for mistakenly 
deporting an American citizen—IJ Cassidy and EOIR officials 
monitored and tracked Professor Stevens’ visits to courtroom 
proceedings all over the Southeast. . . . Upon her arrival, the 
Court Administrator immediately emailed EOIR public 
relations staff that Professor Stevens “want[s] access to view 
the court hearing today . . . Please advise!” According to the 
record, no other individual had ever attracted this kind of 
attention from EOIR officials. Moreover, about a week after the 
expulsion giving rise to this lawsuit, an employee in the 
Department of Justice’s Public Affairs Office emailed his 
colleagues regarding the ‘[p]ossible banning of blogger from 
immigration court.’ These facts animate the claim that the 
process available to Professor Stevens was not just ‘displeasing’ 
but was arguably inadequate as a check on IJ Cassidy’s 
misconduct. - Judge Kathleen Williams.1 
I. Introduction 
Ever since state legislatures and Congress first passed laws to 
remove non-citizens from the United States, those laws and their 
operation have been the cause of controversy and public concern.2 
At the core of the problem is the irreconcilable contradiction 
between the United States Constitution’s protections of due process 
rights through judicial review, on the one hand, and the Supreme 
Court’s creation of prerogatives for the so-called sovereign “nation.”3 
 
 1. Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2017) (Williams, J., 
concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
 2. See generally DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY (2007) (discussing the history of immigration in the United 
States and the complexities of immigration law). 
 3. The concept of the “nation” in U.S. jurisprudence is a fiction borrowed from 
ad hoc treatises and British common law and referenced by the Supreme Court to 
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In 1784, Immanuel Kant wrote: “The problem of establishing a 
perfect civil constitution depends on the problem of law-governed 
external relations among nations and cannot be solved unless the 
latter is.”4 As long as immigration laws are predicated on status 
instead of acts, the rule of law applies only to a select few. As a 
result, when it comes to deportation proceedings, we are a nation of 
edicts, not laws.5 
The ‘immigration judge,’ created by a technical revision to 
agency regulations and post hoc included in U.S. statutes, is in a 
synecdochical relation to this larger paradox of Constitutional case 
law and poses legal and even physical obstacles to its undoing.6 
When describing how to distinguish a government under the rule of 
law from one based on edicts, Lon Fuller’s analysis keeps 
citizenship front and center.7 Fuller’s limits are Kantian-based 
efforts to tie control of law to a non-contradictory exercise of 
citizenship. There are eight ways in which government rules may 
fail the rule of law. These eight paths track the conditions citizens 
need for providing the final determination of the conditions of their 
self-governance, and are not ad hoc procedural restraints on 
government power.8 Indeed, one practical objection to limits on due 
 
carve out exceptions from judicial review. The case law on this quotes from grand 
statements about national and foreign policy in early modern treatises, but offers no 
specific text from the U.S. Constitution that would suggest, much less obligate, the 
carte blanche latitude the Court granted to Congress over immigration policy. See 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609–10 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 
237 (1896). See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A 
Century of “Chinese Exclusion” and Its Progeny, 100 Hᴀʀv. L. Rᴇᴠ. 853, 853–86 
(1987). 
 4. IMMANUEL KANT, IDEA OF A UNIVERSAL HISTORY WITH COSMOPOLITAN 
INTENT 34 (8th Thesis 1784). See also Charles Clarke, Deportation Law and Political 
Theory (2017) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Northwestern University) (available 
on Proquest Dissertations) (analyzing tensions in Kant’s arguments on punishment, 
sovereignty, and deportation). 
 5. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF Lᴀᴡ 42 (Rev. ed. 1969) (stating that Fuller’s 
eight tripwires for the rule of law are: “1) failure to achieve rules at all . . . ; 2) failure 
to publicize, or at least make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected 
to observe; 3) . . . retroactive legislation . . . ; 4) failure to make rules understandable; 
5) . . . contradictory rules; 6) rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the 
affected party; 7) . . . frequent changes in the rules [so] that the subject cannot orient 
his action by them; and 8) failure of congruence between the rules as announced and 
their actual administration.”). 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
 7. FULLER, supra note 5, at 39–42. 
 8. FULLER, supra note 5, at 39–42.  
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process based on so-called alienage is the false positives: without 
the benefit of thorough reviews and legal counsel, the government’s 
ability to easily deport non-citizens facilitates the wrongful 
deportation of citizens as well.9 
When U.S. citizens are detained and deported as aliens, it is 
commonly understood as an ad hoc error.10 In fact, these cases are 
symptoms of a series of Supreme Court decisions that define 
citizenship using the passive criterion of national identity and not 
capacities of self-governance.11 If U.S. citizens are brought under 
the scope of edicts for reporting to Congress and other citizens on 
how the operations of our immigration system are inherently at 
odds with the rule of law, we begin to see how the authoritarian 
character of the deportation machine is controlling our entire 
political decision-making apparatus.12  
This is not an abstract problem. The low quality and quantity 
of information about immigration and deportation going back 
decades—there is scant research on these government operations 
even in universities—has turned citizens into pawns of a complex 
political game among various corporate interests, law enforcement 
agencies, and politicians.13 Journalists and other observers have 
 
 9. Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting 
U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606, 647–48 (2011); Rachel E. 
Rosenbloom, From the Outside Looking in: U.S. Passports in the Borderlands, in 
CITIZENSHIP IN QUESTION: EVIDENTIARY BIRTHRIGHT AND STATELESSNESS 132 
(Benjamin N. Lawrance & Jacqueline Stevens eds., 2017); Jacqueline Stevens, The 
Alien Who Is a Citizen, in CITIZENSHIP IN QUESTION: EVIDENTIARY BRITHRIGHT AND 
STATELESSNESS 217 (Benjamin N. Lawrance & Jacqueline Stevens eds., 2017). 
 10. Stevens, Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, supra note 9, at 629 (quoting Rep. 
Steve King (R-lowa): “There is a huge human haystack of humanity that crosses our 
border every night that has piled up here in the United States . . . . To deal with all 
of that without a single mistake would be asking too much of a mortal.”). 
 11. Stevens, Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, supra note 9, at 635–38 (detailing 
how citizenship is defined). 
 12. The deference to edicts in some U.S. immigration case law is at odds with 
other case law and statutes that have provided non-citizens protections of the rule of 
law. See, e.g., Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212  (1982)  (striking down a Texas statute 
denying funding to school districts that enroll in K-12 schools students not legally 
admitted to the United States; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) 
(“The contention that persons within the territorial jurisdiction of this republic might 
be beyond the protection of the law was heard with pain on the argument at the bar 
-- in face of the great constitutional amendment which declares that no State shall 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); Alien 
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948) (allowing foreign citizens to seek remedies 
though civil tort claims in U.S. courts). 
 13. See, e.g., Jacqueline Stevens, One Dollar Per Day: The Slaving Wages of 
Immigration Jail, from 1943 to Present, 29 Gᴇᴏ. Iᴍᴍɪɢʀ. L.J. 391 (2015) (evaluating 
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complained for years about IJs preventing them from attending 
hearings with no legal basis, despite a regulation mandating public 
access to hearings with rare exceptions.14 In a public letter to the 
Director of the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), 
attorneys noted that the agency and IJs obstructed efforts to 
observe hearings: 
Student observers faced some difficulty completing the full 
number of sessions during the observation period because IJs 
unexpectedly cancelled sessions or prohibited observers from 
attending them. First, several IJs routinely failed to hold 
calendared hearings or cancelled them, sometimes without 
notification to the Court Clerk. Over the course of seven weeks, 
observers were unable to attend 14 of the 45 sessions listed on 
the Court calendar provided to the local bar.15 
 
the legality and the genesis of the one dollar per day wages paid to those in custody 
under immigration laws). 
 14. See Darwin BondGraham, I Was Kicked out of Federal Immigration Court —
Because I’m a Journalist, EAST BAY EXPRESS (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.eastbayex
press.com/SevenDays/archives/2017/02/17/i-was-kicked-out-of-federal-immigration-
court-because-im-a-journalist; The Slow Crisis in Immigration Courts, ON THE 
MEDIA (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.wnyc.org/story/crisis-americas-immigration-cou
rts/ (describing “challenges [journalist Julia Preston] faces accessing courtrooms”); 
Michelle Garcia, Texas Reporters Shut Out of Immigration Court, COLUM. 
JOURNALISM REV. (Aug 13, 2014), https://archives.cjr.org/united_states_project/as_d
eportations_speed_up_reporters_are_shut_out_of_immigration_hearings.php 
(describing access problems due to installation of immigration courts in detention 
facilities not accessible to the public); Jacob Weindling, This Is How ICE Stops 
Journalists from Reporting on Detained Immigrants, PASTE (July 18, 2018), https://
www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2018/07/this-is-how-ice-stops-journalists-from-rep
orting-o.html (“Yesterday the Department of Justice sent a document to all 
Immigration Review courts around McAllen banning unauthorized sketching and 
threatening federal penalties to artists who didn’t comply . . . Harlingen 
Immigration Court [which is open to the public] refused to allow me in to take notes 
until they had called a public affairs officer at the Department of Justice.”); Chava 
Gourarie, Reporting Around ICE, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Aug. 10, 2018), https://
www.cjr.org/covering_trump/reporting-around-ice.php (describing Intercept 
reporter, Debbie Nathan’s experience: “When the court took a break, a bailiff 
approached her and said that the judge wanted to know what she was up to. ‘That’s 
none of your business,’ she recalls saying. ‘This is an open court proceeding.’ She tells 
CJR that he replied, ‘We don’t like your attitude,’ and several armed officers began 
to surround her.”). The public access regulation is 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 (2018); see also 
infra Part IV. 
 15. Letter from Hallie Ludsin, Professor, Emory Law School, Lisa Graybill, 
Deputy Legal Dir., S. Poverty Law Ctr., & Eunice Cho, Staff Attorney, S. Poverty 
Law Ctr., to Juan Osuna, Dir., Exec. Office of Immigration Review, Observations of 
Atlanta Immigration Court 1, 5 (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/defa
ult/files/2017-atl_complaint_letter_final.pdf (“IJ Cassidy expressed dismay about 
‘reporters who write all sorts of things about me.’ He continued: ‘I just follow the law. 
When you have an uninvited guest in your home, what do you do? You have to tell 
them to leave.’”). 
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Complaints from journalists and students suggest an absence 
of redress for a pattern and practice of IJs obstructing the public 
from observing immigration hearings. The loose procedural 
protections afforded to immigrants based on intuitions imputed to 
common law for a status denoted by birth gives free reign to an 
agency that is prohibiting by edict citizens from interrogating the 
conditions of their self-governance.16 
This Article is part of a broader argument about the need to 
eliminate the tension Kant identified between the rule of law and 
the “nation.” In particular, we argue that “citizenship” should be 
construed as self-governance that promotes the rule of law, and not 
status based on birth, either in a particular territory or to particular 
parents.17  One bulwark against tyranny is the exposure of 
government proceedings to the citizens. The “failure to publicize, or 
at least make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected 
to observe”18 implies a corollary obligation to avoid arbitrary and 
unintended outcomes by providing decision-makers with accurate 
information about the law’s implementation. The sovereign, be it a 
dictator or a plebiscite, has as much need for accurate information 
about the administration of law as those affected. Absent this, rules 
 
 16. Judges, civil rights attorneys, law professors, community professionals and 
other concerned citizens have expressed outrage over the anti-American brutality of 
deportations since the government first began to abuse those who were foreign-born, 
with and without government authority. See, e.g., Reuben Oppenheimer, Report on 
the Enforcement of the Deportation Laws of the United States, in 5 NAT’L COMM’N ON 
LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, U.S. WICKERSHAM COMMISSION REPORTS 43–45 
(1931); Jack Wasserman, Some Defects in the Administration of Our Immigration 
Laws, 21 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 376, 377 (1956) (“Then there is the case of Michael 
Spinella, who was kidnapped by our immigration officials while on a visit to 
Washington, D.C. He was denied an opportunity to phone his attorney, to seek 
judicial review of his deportation order, to bid farewell to his family, or to gather his 
personal belongings prior to his deportation to Italy. Nor are these gestapo-like 
tactics but isolated instances of administrative superefficiency.”). Wasserman was 
the attorney who represented Wong Yang Sung before the Supreme Court and won 
a habeas order overturning a deportation order based on his argument that the 
immigration hearings failed to comply with the Administrative Procedures Act. See 
infra Part IV.C. 
 17. JACQUELINE STEVENS, STATES WITHOUT NATIONS: CITIZENSHIP FOR 
MORTALS (2009) (providing political, theoretical and policy arguments for 
eliminating birthright citizenship). The new project, of which this essay is a part, 
ties these ideas to the U.S. Constitution and is indebted to work by Daniel Morales, 
especially Undocumented Migrants as New (and Peaceful) Revolutionaries, 12 DUKE 
J. CONST. L. PUB. POL’Y 135 (2016) and Illegal Migration Is Speech, 92 IND. L.J. 735 
(2017). 
 18. FULLER, supra note 5, at 39. 
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are solipsistic projections unmoored from their purpose of 
regulating behavior––thus, they are not laws.19 
The nature of immigration hearings is to stage both the 
government’s broad authority to pursue foreign policy and the life 
altering and even deadly effects of these prerogatives on 
individuals.20 The prejudices animating the Court’s mythical 
construction of a fictional “nation” are tied to treatises on hereditary 
monarchies and bereft of roots in the text of the Constitution.21 As 
such, the dramas that unfold in deportation hearings are those to 
which a democratic republic requires extensive exposure.22 
“Democrac[ies] die in darkness,”23 not just from hidden corruption, 
but also because citizens remain ignorant of the scope and impact 
of policies they self-legislate.24 The chief obstacle to hearing access 
is the IJ ordering force against third parties.25 
 
 19. There are numerous other potential benefits of publicity integral to the U.S. 
Constitutional democracy, such as thwarting corruption, retaliation, and stupidity. 
But without accurate information of a law’s implementation good, honest, intelligent 
people will be unable to craft a policy rather than a random guess born of ignorance. 
Letter XIII in PLATO, COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, INCLUDING THE LETTERS 
1562 (1961) (“Those who on any occasion bring you information are unwilling to 
inform you of anything that they suppose involves expense . . . You must yourself be 
acquainted every detail as far as you can and be your own judge, and not avoid such 
acquaintance with details, since nothing could be more advantageous for you in your 
government.”). 
 20. Julia Preston, Lawyers Back Creating New Immigration Courts, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/us/09immig.html (statement of 
Dana Marks, President, National Association of Immigration Judges) (arguing 
asylum cases resemble “holding death penalty cases in traffic court.”). 
 21. Supra text accompanying note 3. 
 22. Supra text accompanying note 3. 
 23. Paul Farhi, The Washington Post’s New Slogan Turns Out to be an Old 
Saying, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style
/the-washington-posts-new-slogan-turns-out-to-be-an-old-saying/2017/02/23/cb199c
da-fa02-11e6-be05-1a3817ac21a5_story.html?utm_term=.58645c31148a. 
 24. Perhaps if IJs were held accountable for blocking access to hearing rooms, 
families who voted to elect Donald Trump as their president would not have been 
“ashamed” when a relative was deported, and perhaps members of Congress who 
support limited government would catch the contradiction between their 
endorsement of free market and “Customs and Border Protection.” Harriet 
Agerholm, Trump Voter ‘Ashamed’ to Be American After Daughter-in-law is 
Deported, INDEPENDENT (July 24, 2018, 11:28 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/americas/trump-voter-deportations-ashamed-daughter-letty-stegall-ille
gal-immigration-a8461111.html; Alex Nowrasteh, The 14 Most Common Arguments 
Against Immigration and Why They’re Wrong, CATO INSTITUTE (May 2, 2018 11:10 
AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/14-most-common-arguments-against-immigration-w
hy-theyre-wrong. 
 25. See infra Part II. 
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The case against absolute judicial immunity for immigration 
hearing officers accused of law-breaking conduct toward third 
parties is based on the administrative organization of immigration 
courts,26 the statutory limits of IJ contempt authority,27 case law 
limiting contempt authority to power authorized by legislatures 
(including Congress),28 and the documented absence of any effective 
oversight available through the agency’s own misconduct 
investigations. In a recent case, however, the Eleventh Circuit held 
that an IJ ordering guards to force an observer from a federal 
building was entitled to immunity from suit for injunctive and 
declaratory relief and from damages.29 To explain its decision, the 
Eleventh Circuit stated: 
[E]ven if Judge Cassidy lacked express statutory or regulatory 
authority to order Plaintiff removed from the court building, 
Judge Cassidy acted in no ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction’ in 
doing so. Immigration Judges do have express authority to 
‘regulate the course’ of removal hearings. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 
1240.1(c), 1240.9. This authority triggers obligation. Based on 
this authority, the EOIR has recognized ‘that at times an 
Immigration Judge must be firm and decisive to maintain 
courtroom control.30 
The Eleventh Circuit panel held that IJs should be afforded 
absolute judicial immunity because their functions appeared to 
track those of Article III judges and because prior case law had 
afforded judicial immunity to administrative law judges governed 
by the Administrative Procedures Act to thwart the inconvenience 
of litigation. The lack of transparency and accountability enabled 
by this analysis, coupled with protocols that operate daily in 
immigration courts across the country, demonstrate precisely the 
problems anticipated by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution and 
 
 26. Federal judges by statute have criminal contempt powers. See 18 U.S.C. § 
401. IJs do not have statutory or any other legal authority over building guards or 
security protocols other than those created by the Eleventh Circuit in Stevens v. 
Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 27. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1). See infra Part III. 
 28. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 48–51 (1941). See infra Part IV. 
 29. Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1307 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding Judge 
Cassidy was entitled to absolute immunity because the plaintiff failed to adequately 
allege that Judge Cassidy acted “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”). See also 
Bloodworth v. United States, No. 5:13-CV-112, 2014 WL 1813374, at *1 (M.D. Ga. 
May 7, 2014) (concluding Judge Cassidy was entitled to absolute immunity) (citing 
Stevens v. Holder, 950 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1291 (N.D. Ga. 2013)). 
 30. Stevens, 877 F.3d at 1307. The analysis will be reviewed in detail below. See 
infra Part IV. 
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their English Whig counterparts: a bureaucratic backwater in 
which cronyism breeds corruption, incompetence, and vengeance, 
and chokes out justice behind closed doors.31 
In this Article, we first review the political and legal theory 
the Eleventh Circuit overlooked in their mechanistic invocation of 
absolute judicial immunity on behalf of IJ Cassidy. In particular, 
we highlight the larger project of the rule of law pursued by three 
great liberals in conversation across generations—Edward Coke, 
John Locke, and Thomas Jefferson—to explain how absolute 
judicial immunity was instrumental to their pre-eminent project of 
legislative supremacy in service of “a government of the people, by 
the people, [and] for the people,” not an end in itself.32 Second, we 
review current case law on administrative judge absolute 
immunity. Third, we highlight legal similarities between IJs and 
other administrators assessing immigration claims through 
historical immigration court statutes and regulations. Fourth, we 
show that the case law on contempt authority demands judicial 
deference to statutory limits of a contempt power that would 
disallow inferring that managing access to the court is a ‘judicial 
function’ of an IJ. Finally, we analyze the misconduct investigation 
protocols of the agency and provide quantitative and qualitative 
analyses of 768 misconduct complaints and investigations 
conducted between 2004 and 2016. This section explains how the 
agency’s organization not only fails to prevent IJ misconduct, but 
may incentivize it, thus providing concrete policy grounds for 
allowing civil suits against IJs who deny access to immigration 
courts in violation of constitutional rights.33 
 
 31. As observed by law school students who were denied access to hearings at 
the Atlanta Immigration Court. See Ludsin et al., supra note 15. See also infra Part 
V, note 347.  
 32. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (1863) (transcript available in the 
Cornell University Library). 
 33. One co-author of this Article (Stevens) was a plaintiff who filed pro se the 
first complaint and the first response to the motion to dismiss in a case before the 
Eleventh Circuit. Thereafter, attorneys drafted an amended complaint and motions 
with more emphasis on broad principles of Constitutional law and less on the 
statutory authority of immigration judges. See Court Docket, Stevens, 877 F.3d 1293 
(No. 16-12007). The fact pattern of this case is similar to those of other observers. 
See supra, notes 14 and 15 and accompanying text. The purpose of the suit and this 
Article is to use these experiences to further elucidate the curious departures of U.S. 
immigration courts from the Constitution. Jacqueline Stevens, Forensic Intelligence 
and the Deportation Research Clinic: Toward a New Paradigm, 13 PERSPECTIVES ON 
POL. 722, 722–38 (2015) (explaining a research agenda that iteratively exposes 
injustice through a dialectical engagement of scholarship, litigation, and publicity); 
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II. History and Political Theory for Absolute Judicial 
Immunity 
Any analysis of government official immunity––especially one 
based on claims untethered to any specific passage of the 
Constitution, statute, or regulation––must be grounded in a 
government’s foundational principles. One figure whose 
jurisprudence, political causes and career, and scholarship looms 
large over judicial review and the centrality of courts to the rule of 
law and many other questions is Sir Edward Coke. Coke was a judge 
and Attorney General under Queen Elizabeth; Chief Justice of the 
Common Pleas and the Kings Bench under James I; and a member 
of Parliament after James I disregarded Coke’s arguments that a 
judge could apply the law and rule so as to restrain monarchical 
authority.34 In 1625, to thwart Coke’s consistent attempts to elevate 
Acts of Parliament over the monarch’s unilateral orders, taxation, 
and conscription, King Charles appointed Coke Sheriff of 
Buckinghamshire. As Sheriff, Coke was legally compelled him to 
remain in his county and thus could not attend Parliament.35 On 
top of his political career, Coke single-handedly compiled thirteen 
volumes of English case law, including many of his own opinions.36 
Coke’s commitment above all else was to the rule of law 
through Parliamentary supremacy checked by the rights of the 
people, not deference to the monarch (or executive).37 His arguments 
 
see also Deportation Research Clinic, Clinic in the News, BUFFET INST. FOR GLOB. 
STUDIES, https://buffett.northwestern.edu/programs/deportationresearch/clinic-in-t
he-news.html. 
 34. STEVE SHEPHERD, SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, vol. I, 
Introduction, at xxiii (2003). 
 35. Id. at lxii. 
 36. Id. 
 37. SIR EDWARD COKE, CONFERENCE BEFORE THE KING (1607) reprinted in 
SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, vol. I, 478–82 (2003) (stating that Coke 
participated in a conference of judges and “informed the King that he does not have 
the privilege to personally decide a Case at Law. . . And the Judges informed the 
King, that no King after the conquest assumed to himself to give any Judgment in 
any cause whatsoever, which concerned the administration of Justice within this 
Realm, but these were solely determined in the Courts of Justice. And the King 
cannot arrest any man, as the book is in 1 Hen. 7.4, for the party cannot have remedy 
against the King; so if the King give any Judgment, what remedy can the party have, 
vide 39 Ed. 3.”). Coke noted that “no man shall be put to answer without presentment 
before the Justices, matter of Record, or by due process, or by writ Originall, 
according to the ancient Law of the Land: And if any thing be done against it, it shall 
be void in Law and held for Error.” Id. Upon “receipt of these findings, ‘the King was 
greatly offended, and said, that then he should be under the Law, which was Treason 
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for judicial discretion and immunity were intended to relieve the 
people of unfair penalties and protect them from the government—
substantive objectives of justice, not abstract proceduralism. This 
helps orient us to the values and priorities proper for assessing 
contemporary questions of absolute judicial immunity in general 
and the contexts in which it may be afforded to administrative 
judges.38  
In brief, Coke endorsed judges expressing intuitions favoring 
the people against the elites or King, and favored positive law 
passed by legislatures over edicts of a monarch or a magistrate.39 
These priorities are compromised by a jurisprudence in which 
judges can create absolute judicial immunity for administrative 
judges who order the use of force against critics to prevent access to 
a public hearing in violation of their statutory boundaries.40  
IJ Cassidy, after being repeatedly embarrassed by the 
reporting on his official conduct, ordered guards to use force to 
remove Stevens from a federal building lobby as part of a plan for 
her “‘[p]ossible banning’” from immigration hearings.41 This 
 
to affirm. . . To which I said, that Bracton saith, Quod Rex non debt esse sub homine, 
sed sub Deo et Lege [The king ought not to be under any man, but under God and 
the Law.].’” Id. 
 38. Margaret Z. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not a Big Tent: The Improper Expansion 
of Absolute Judicial Immunity to Non-Judges in Civil-Rights Cases, 59 SMU L. REV. 
265, 270 n.30 (2006) (“With respect to judicial immunity, it is not at all clear that the 
common law granted judges absolute immunity in 1871. Nor is it clear that Congress 
intended to insulate judges from civil-rights liability. Indeed, to the extent that there 
is legislative history on the point, it suggests that Congress intended to impose 
liability on judges under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”) (internal citations omitted). 
Johns analyzes the deference of the Court to an imagined common law tradition 
granting absolute judicial immunity to judges in influential cases, including Buckley 
v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 484–85 
(1991). See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 
U.S. 367, 382–83 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1201 (2001) (explaining why sovereign 
immunities should and will be eliminated). 
 39. See SIR EDWARD COKE, FLOYD AND BARKER (1607) reprinted in STEVE 
SHEPHERD, SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, vol. I, 427–32 (2003) 
(discussing judicial immunity). 
 40. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 41. Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1315 n.3 (11th Cir. 2017). In July 2018, 
EOIR issued a press release revising its protocols for access to immigration hearings. 
It authorized IJs to close hearings without allowing the observers a chance to state 
the case for open hearings, weighing the First Amendment or other equities of 
potential observers, stating a reason for the closure in the presence of the observers, 
or even providing a record of the closure. EOIR, Fact Sheet: Observing Immigration 
Court Hearings, (July 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1079306/downloa
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incident is part of a pattern of court administrators and IJs across 
the country summarily closing hearing rooms to observers absent 
any evidence, much less formal findings of disorderly conduct or 
other grounds for summary contempt orders against them. 
Congress has not authorized this power for IJs.42  
Nor does this power come from values at common law. 
Although Coke noted that judges “cannot be charged for Conspiracy, 
for that which he did openly in Court,”43 if they do so “out of Court, 
this is extrajudicial.”44 Coke likewise explained it is a judicial 
function to inquire through testimony, but contrasted this with a 
judge or prosecutor who may pursue “false and malicious 
Persecutions, out of Court, to such whom he knowes will be 
Indictors, to find any guilty, &c. amounts to an unlawful 
Conspiracy.”45 Coke’s framework prevented judges from being 
brought before the Star Chamber “for this would tend to the 
scandall and subversion of all Justice,”46 and also sought to prevent 
infinite litigation about litigation.47 Nonetheless, Coke believed 
judges’ conduct was constrained “by the authority which the King 
hath committed to him.”48 For conduct beyond this, judges could be 
held accountable for abusing their official position.49 In sum, Coke 
carefully laid out the importance of independent scrutiny of conduct 
without authority, pursued for private ends, and as part of an 
unlawful conspiracy for which no immunities are available. 
John Locke, another important influence on the framers of the 
U.S. Constitution,50 also viewed the Parliament as the supreme and 
exclusive law-making body.51 Indeed, Locke identified the 
 
d. 
 42. See supra note 14 (journalists prohibited from observing immigration 
hearings) and infra Part V (IJs have no summary contempt powers). 
 43. SIR EDWARD COKE, FLOYD AND BARKER, supra note 39, at 429. 
 44. SIR EDWARD COKE, FLOYD AND BARKER, supra note 39, at 429. 
 45. SIR EDWARD COKE, FLOYD AND BARKER, supra note 39, at 429–30. 
 46. SIR EDWARD COKE, FLOYD AND BARKER, supra note 39, at 431. 
 47. SIR EDWARD COKE, FLOYD AND BARKER, supra note 39, at 431.  
 48. SIR EDWARD COKE, FLOYD AND BARKER, supra note 39, at 431. 
 49. SIR EDWARD COKE, FLOYD AND BARKER, supra note 39, at 431. 
 50. See generally Isaac Kramnick, The ‘Great National Discussion’: The 
Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (describing Locke’s influence on 
federalists and anti-federalists). 
 51. See generally WILLMOORE KENDALL, JOHN LOCKE AND THE DOCTRINE OF 
MAJORITY RULE (2nd ed. 1959) (providing a historical investigation into the doctrine 
of majority rule). For an elaboration of the political context behind Locke’s and Coke’s 
preference of the House of Commons over other English legal bodies, see Jacqueline 
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legislature with majoritarianism and thus claimed unworkable the 
ability of the House of Lords to veto bills from the House of 
Commons.52 Locke wrote: 
The people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth, 
which is by constituting the legislative, and appointing in 
whose hands that shall be. And when the people have said, We 
will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such 
men, and in such forms, no body else can say other men shall 
make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws, 
but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen, and 
authorized to make laws for them. The power of the legislative, 
being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and 
institution, can be no other than what that positive grant 
conveyed, which being only to make laws, not to make 
legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their 
authority of making laws, and place it other hands.53 
Here and in many other passages, Locke offered pragmatic, political 
arguments on the legitimacy of majority rule and the illegitimacy of 
hereditary monarchical authority or obligations imposed by force 
based on the orders of any other minoritarian body, including a 
judiciary that crafts decisions independent of positive law.54 
The debates about parliamentary supremacy during the last 
decades of the Stuarts, before and after the English Civil War, 
resonated in the ideas and doctrines of those who pursued the 
American Revolution.55 These earlier struggles with the arbitrary 
power of the English monarchy were well recognized by their 
compatriots in the colonies.56 Thomas Jefferson’s notable emphasis 
of the jurisprudence of Coke over that of the common law canonized 
by the more conservative William Blackstone in his Commentaries 
is relevant to the question of whether the judiciary can indeed 
 
Stevens, The Reasonableness of John Locke’s Majority: Property Rights, Consent, and 
Resistance in the Second Treatise, 24 POL. THEORY 423 (1996). 
 52. This veto power was a compromise between the officers and soldiers of the 
Parliamentary army imposed in 1649 in the wake of their victory against Charles I 
in the English Civil War. PURITANISM AND LIBERTY: BEING THE ARMY DEBATES 
(1647-9) FROM THE CLARKE MANUSCRIPTS WITH SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS (2d ed. 
1974). 
 53. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, XI. § 141 (1690). 
 54. Id. See also JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999) (arguing that 
Constitutional judicial review of statutes is arbitrary and favors elites). 
 55. Julian S. Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone’s Commentaries, 27 
ILL. L. REV. 629, 640–41 (1933). 
 56. Id. 
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create absolute judicial immunity absent any express statutory 
authority.57 
In an 1812 letter to Judge John Tyler, Jefferson expressed his 
views that  Blackstone’s jurisprudence favoring judicial edicts over 
positive law “perverted” the law and created a “degeneracy of legal 
science,” in contrast with the doctrine tying jurisprudence to the 
legislature found in the “deep and rich mines of Coke Littleton.”58 
An 1826 letter to James Madison discussing the appointment of a 
law professor at the recently opened University of Virginia, further 
reveals Jefferson’s concern with a legal education that fails to stress 
the importance of judges abiding by legislative acts: 
In the selection of our Law Professor, we must be 
rigorously attentive to his political principles. You will 
recollect that before the Revolution, Coke Littleton [sic] 
was the universal elementary book of law students, and 
a sounder whig never wrote, nor of profounder learning 
in the orthodox doctrines of the British constitution, or in 
what were called English liberties. You remember also 
that our lawyers were then all whigs. But when his black-
letter text and uncouth but cunning learning got out of 
fashion, and the honied Mansfieldism of Blackstone 
became the student’s horn-book, from that moment, that 
profession (the nursery of our Congress) began to slide 
into toryism, and nearly all the young brood of lawyers 
now are of that hue. They suppose themselves, indeed to 
be whigs, because they no longer know what whigism or 
republicanism means. It is in our seminary that that 
vestal flame is to be kept alive; it is thence it is to spread 
anew over our own and the sister States.59 
Mansfield, Blackstone’s patron, was Chief Justice of England from 
1756 to 1778 as well as a “legal adviser to the group which was 
 
 57. Id. at 634 (“The distinction between [those who rely on Blackstone], and those 
who have drawn their stores from the deep and rich mines of Coke Littleton, [sic] 
seems well understood even by the unlettered common people, who apply the 
appellation of Blackstone lawyers to these ephemeral insects of the law.”) (quoting 
Jefferson “Writings” (ed. Washington) Vol. VI pp. 65–66). Waterman notes: “This 
letter of June 17, 1812, was in reply to one of Judge Tyler, Federal District Judge in 
Virginia, of May 17, 1812, who sat with Marshall in Livingston v. Jefferson (1811) 1 
Brock. 203, Fed. Cas. No. 8411. Jefferson was asked to express his view on ‘common 
law rights’ as set forth by Marshall [1 LYON GARDINER TYLER, LETTERS AND TIMES 
OF THE TYLERS 263-64 (1884)].” 
 58. Waterman, supra note 55, at 634. 
 59. Waterman, supra note 55, at 635. 
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determining England’s colonial policy.”60 Mansfieldism was an 
insidious attack on democratic self-rule. 
Julian Waterman observes, “[a]s early as 1788 Jefferson 
expressed fear of the ‘sly poison’ of Mansfield’s legal innovations.”61 
Of particular concern were bench trials allowing for the “‘judicial 
freedom of decision’ which chancery judges practiced,” and other 
artifices of judicial authority unmoored from popular rule, the cure 
for which Jefferson found in juries.62 Coke urged following 
precedent so as to codify the meaning of positive law across judges 
and circuits, whereas Blackstone’s jurisprudence invited judges to 
speak among themselves and create law across generations. 
Jefferson believed that judges in the United States under the sway 
of Blackstone had been “adopting a body of law of questionable 
merit to govern the people, when it ought to have been left for the 
legislative branch to enact it in such part and of such a period as it 
saw fit.”63 In sum, Jefferson abhorred judicial review based on case 
law unmoored from statute and also was distrustful of verdicts by 
single judges and not juries. 
III. Current Precedent on IJ Absolute Judicial Immunity 
There is little precedent directly addressing the question of 
whether IJs have absolute judicial immunity from suits for 
injunctive and declaratory relief for closing hearings, or from 
personal liability for torts. Nevertheless, the 2017 Eleventh Circuit 
appellate panel ruling affording absolute judicial immunity from 
remedial, injunctive, and declaratory relief to IJ orders closing 
hearings takes a sharp departure from similar cases.64 
A. Pechter v. Lyons (1977) 
In Pechter, defendant IJ Francis Lyons allowed the media to 
observe the deportation hearings of an accused Nazi war criminal, 
but closed the hearings to the public.65 Led by Bonnie Pechter, 
 
 60. Waterman, supra note 55, at 642. 
 61. Waterman, supra note 55, at 642. 
 62. Waterman, supra note 55, at 643. 
 63. Waterman, supra note 55, at 634–44. 
 64. Compare Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017), with Pechter v. 
Lyons, 441 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 
2d 948 (E.D. Mich. 2002), and N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 
(3d Cir. 2002). 
 65. Pechter, 441 F. Supp. at 117. 
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several citizens filed a motion in federal district court requesting 
preliminary injunctive relief.66 Instead of defending the IJ’s order, 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service joined Pechter in 
objecting to the order.67 Defendant IJ Lyons also appeared before 
the federal district court judge and urged an independent review of 
his agency’s decision to overturn his order.68 
The plaintiffs prevailed.69 Although this is but one decision in 
one federal district court, its analysis is on point for the central 
claims in this Article and bears careful review. The regulation 
discussed in Pechter provided IJs discretion to close hearings to the 
public identical to that afforded in the contemporary regulation on 
public access to immigration hearings.70 The order in Pechter quoted 
the regulation on public access to hearings: 
This regulation is but one of countless manifestations of a 
public policy centuries old that judicial proceedings, especially 
those in which the life or liberty of an individual is at stake, 
should be subject to public scrutiny, not only for the protection 
 
 66. Id. at 115–16. 
 67. Id. at 117. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 120. 
 70. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 246.16(a) (“Deportation hearings shall be open to the 
public, except that the special inquiry officer may, in his discretion and for the 
purpose of protecting witnesses, respondents, or the public interest, direct that the 
general public or particular individuals shall be excluded from the hearing in any 
specific case. Depending upon physical facilities, reasonable limitation may be placed 
upon the number in attendance at any one time, with priority being given to the 
press over the general public.”), with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 (2018) (“Public access to 
hearings. All hearings, other than exclusion hearings, shall be open to the public 
except that: 
(a) Depending upon physical facilities, the Immigration Judge may place reasonable 
limitations upon the number in attendance at any one time with priority being given 
to the press over the general public; 
(b) For the purpose of protecting witnesses, parties, or the public interest, the 
Immigration Judge may limit attendance or hold a closed hearing. 
(c) In any proceeding before an Immigration Judge concerning an abused alien 
spouse, the hearing and the Record of Proceeding shall be closed to the public unless 
the abused spouse agrees that the hearing and the Record of Proceeding shall be 
open to the public. In any proceeding before an Immigration Judge concerning an 
abused alien child, the hearing and the Record of Proceeding shall be closed to the 
public. 
(d) Proceedings before an Immigration Judge shall be closed to the public if 
information subject to a protective order under § 1003.46, which has been filed under 
seal pursuant to § 1003.31(d), may be considered.”), and Public Access to Hearings, 
52 Fed. Reg. 2936, 2938 (Jan. 29, 1987), amended by Public Access to Hearings, 57 
Fed. Reg. 11571, 11572 (Apr. 6, 1992); Public Access to Hearings, 62 Fed. Reg. 10334 
(Mar. 6, 1997); Public Access to Hearings, 67 Fed. Reg. 36802 (May 28, 2002). 
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of the individual from unwarranted and arbitrary conviction, 
but also to protect the public from lax prosecution. Unless 
members of the general public have standing to assert their 
rights under this regulation, its purpose could conceivably be 
defeated by a secret collusive hearing or arbitrary 
prosecution.71 
Pechter is not accusing IJ Lyons of impropriety, but the rationale of 
standing for the public’s right to sue for injunctive relief is on point. 
If IJ Lyons has absolute judicial immunity, then, according to 
Stevens, discussed below, the public cannot sue in district court 
even for injunctive relief.72 
In Pechter, the district court judge provided a long list of 
precedent in support of the public’s right to observe immigration 
hearings.73 The order did not consider the question of absolute 
judicial immunity as a bar to litigation: 
Even the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, 
although clearly designed primarily for the benefit of the 
defendant, has been construed to have a broader purpose as 
well. As was stated in Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791, 792 (4th 
Cir. 1965): “The right to a public trial is not only to protect the 
accused but to protect as much the public’s right to know what 
goes on when men’s lives and liberty are at stake, for a secret 
trial can result in favor to as well as unjust prosecution of a 
defendant.” In United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 924 (3d Cir. 
1949), the court stated: “[T]he right . . . accorded to members of 
the public to be present at a criminal trial as mere 
spectators . . . has been imbedded in our Constitution as an 
important safeguard not only to the accused but to the public 
generally.”74 
After pointing out the public’s standing to sue for access to 
immigration hearings, the judge turned to whether there was an 
administrative remedy.75 The analysis anticipated the problems 
raised in the Eleventh Circuit order and highlighted by the 
Concurring opinion quoted at the beginning of this Article: 
 
 71. Pechter v. Lyons, 441 F. Supp. 115, 117–18 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In a footnote, 
the judge added: “In 1641, the General Court of Massachusetts Bay Colony enacted 
‘The Massachusetts Body of Liberties,’ including the following passage: Every man 
whether Inhabitant or forreiner, free or not free shall have libertie to come to any 
publique Court, Councell, or Towne meeting.” Id. at 118 n.2 (internal citations 
omitted). 
 72. Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Absolute immunity 
protects Judge Cassidy both from Plaintiff’s Bivens claim seeking money damages 
and also the claim for injunctive relief.”). 
 73. Pechter, 441 F. Supp. at 119–20. 
 74. Id. at 118. 
 75. Id. 
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Next, it is necessary to briefly consider whether the plaintiffs 
may have an administrative remedy that should be pursued 
before resorting to the district court. Upon scrutiny, it appears 
that they do not. They cannot intervene in the deportation 
proceeding, since they assert no interest in its outcome—their 
interest is solely in monitoring the process by which the 
outcome is determined. Indeed the hearing structure of INS is 
designed only to deal with questions that arise in the context of 
regular administrative proceedings. Its regulations provide no 
mechanism whatsoever for dealing with claims of strangers to 
a proceeding. Moreover, there appears to be no procedure for 
interlocutory appeals within the agency for the regulations 
provide for appeals from “decisions,” not from interlocutory 
orders, of the hearing officer. Obviously, by the time agency 
review of the order closing the hearing could be obtained, the 
issue would be moot. Thus, the plaintiffs having no 
administrative remedy, it is entirely proper for them to address 
their claim to this court.76 
Having decided that he had jurisdiction, the judge then established 
that the standard for evaluating Lyon’s decision would be “whether 
Judge Lyons abused his discretion.”77  
After a review of additional case law on public access to 
hearings, he found Lyons had done just that: 
Here, although Judge Lyons has before him a respondent of 
some notoriety, whose life or person may indeed be in some 
danger, I cannot but conclude that it is possible to assure 
appropriate security within the courtroom itself—that is, 
orderly spectators without weapons—thereby protecting the 
respondent without sacrificing the openness that is so 
fundamental to our system . . . The only possible purpose in 
closing the hearing, therefore, is to protect him from harm 
within the courtroom. Given the fact that INS has assured this 
court that it can employ the same protective measures to guard 
the deportation hearing room as are used in federal courts in 
cases where there is reason to anticipate violence in the 
courtroom, there is no rational basis for concluding that closing 
the hearing room to the public will offer significant additional 
protection to the respondent. It necessarily follows that Judge 
Lyons, in barring the public from the courtroom under these 
circumstances, abused his discretion.78 
No party raised the possibility that the action was not 
reviewable, or that IJs had absolute judicial immunity. The order 
was not appealed. 
 
 76. Id. at 119 (internal citations omitted). 
 77. Pechter v. Lyons, 441 F. Supp. 115, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (emphasis added). 
 78. Id. at 120. 
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B. Post-9/11 National Security Hearing Closures 
The next cases about whether the public could be barred from 
observing immigration proceedings took a different posture.79 In 
Pechter, the question was whether the IJ abused his discretion in 
closing the hearing, a policy at odds with the preferences of the 
INS.80 In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft81 and North Jersey Media 
Group v. Ashcroft82 the IJs closed hearings for national security 
grounds at the direction of the Office of the Chief Immigration 
Judge.83 In both cases, media groups sued under the First 
Amendment and requested injunctive relief.84 In its response to the 
first case, the government moved to dismiss by alleging that the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA) precluded judicial review: “The Government 
interprets the INA as affording judicial review only in the court of 
appeals and only after a final order of removal has been issued.”85 
Neither the Sixth Circuit nor the Third Circuit found the motions 
to dismiss based on IIRIRA persuasive, and both courts reviewed 
the petitions for injunctive relief.86 The Sixth Circuit held the order 
closing the hearing violated the First Amendment.87 The Third 
Circuit focused on the Government’s national security argument 
and found that the equities outweighed North Jersey Media Group’s 
First Amendment claim.88 At no point did the respective defenses or 
 
 79. For a review of cases that protect the First Amendment right to observe 
immigration hearings, see Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and 
Beyond: Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 95 (2004). 
 80. Pechter, 441 F. Supp. at 119. 
 81. 195 F. Supp. 2d 948 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
 82. 308 F.3d 198, 199 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 83. Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 950–51 (“Chief Immigration Judge 
Michael Creppy issued a directive to all United States Immigration Judges 
mandating that they close immigration proceedings to the press and public 
(including family members of the deportee) in certain ‘special interest’ cases 
identified by the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (‘the Creppy directive’).”). 
 84. Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 951; North Jersey Media Group, 308 
F.3d at 198. 
 85. Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 950. 
 86. Id. at 948; North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 198. 
 87. Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 951. 
 88. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 217 (“In this case the Government 
presented substantial evidence that open deportation hearings would threaten 
national security.”). The order includes a caveat confining it to the context of 
hearings ordered closed for reasons of national security. Id. at 220 (“We do not decide 
that there is no right to attend administrative proceedings, or even that there is no 
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decisions contemplate absolute judicial immunity for an IJ who 
ordered a closed hearing, much less the use of force without 
statutory authority.89 
C. Bloodworth v. United States (2014) 
The next case reviewing a claim for exclusion from a hearing 
was brought by a man whose wife was detained and in removal 
proceedings.90 Edward Bloodworth, pro se, filed a lawsuit against 
employees at the federal building housing Atlanta’s immigration 
court, including the IJ.91 In an order granting the government’s 
motion for summary judgment, the federal district court judge 
found that among the many allegations, “the only claim Bloodworth 
arguably raised was a denial of access to [Cassidy’s] immigration 
court.”92 The court noted that Bloodworth had failed to establish a 
right to appear in an immigration court as a witness in support of 
his detained wife’s petition for legal permanent residency.93 The 
order included no discussion of absolute judicial immunity. 
D. Stevens v. Attorney General (2012-2017) 
In the third case, a political scientist reporting on IJ 
misconduct on her blog and the Nation magazine94 filed an 
 
right to attend any immigration proceeding.”). 
 89. For a close reading of these cases, see Kitrosser, supra note 79. 
 90. Bloodworth v. United States, No. 5:13-CV-112 (MTT), 2014 WL 1813374, at 
*1 (M.D. Ga. May 7, 2014). It is important to note that the factual record is based 
exclusively on the record submitted by the government. Id. at *9 n.19 (“Bloodworth 
failed to respond to the Government’s statement of undisputed facts and thus those 
facts are admitted.”). 
 91. Id. at *1. 
 92. Id. at *7. 
 93. Id. at *9 (“Further, Bloodworth has not shown he had an unequivocal right 
to be present for his wife’s immigration proceedings. There is no doubt that the 
United States citizen spouse, or other qualifying relative, of an illegal alien who is 
applying for a waiver while in removal proceedings is a vital witness. Judges Cassidy 
and Pelletier expressed the importance of Bloodworth’s presence for the 601 
hearings, and the transcript of Cho’s immigration proceedings clearly shows Judge 
Cassidy attempted to instruct Cho’s various attorneys what steps to take to ensure 
Bloodworth was present or could at least testify through some means. However, 
Bloodworth has cited no authority showing he had an unqualified right to be present 
at the hearing in light of his disruptive actions.”). 
 94. Jacqueline Stevens, STATES WITHOUT NATIONS, http://stateswithoutnations.
blogspot.com (drawing attention, on several occasions, to actions by IJ Cassidy that 
resulted in the prolonged detention or deportation of U.S. citizens as aliens, and 
commenting on the unlawful nature of these actions) (last visited May 5, 2019). See 
also Jacqueline Stevens, Secret Courts Exploit Immigrants, NATION (June 29, 
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administrative complaint and then a lawsuit against the Attorney 
General. She alleged that top EOIR officials were conspiring with 
IJ William Cassidy and guards and court staff in Georgia to prevent 
her from observing immigration hearings.95 The case involved 
numerous occurrences over the course of ten months in 2009-10, 
including court administrators not posting dockets,96 guards not 
allowing entrance to public hearings,97 and guards forcing Stevens 
from the immigration court lobby and out of the building more than 
fifteen minutes after she “asked Cassidy if the respondent had 
asked for a closed hearing.”98 Stevens filed an administrative 
misconduct complaint, and Cassidy denied ordering the removal to 
the supervisor investigating the case.99 A transcript of the guard 
calling in an incident report subsequently obtained from the 
Federal Protective Services noted that Cassidy not only had ordered 
this removal but that it was part of a plan to ban Stevens from the 
building.100 
In contrast to its position in Pechter, here the government 
asserted that IJs had absolute judicial immunity from damages and 
injunctive and declaratory relief in performing judicial functions.101 
The government cited to Butz v. Economou,102 a case affording 
absolute judicial immunity to administrative law judges for work 
 
2009), http://www.thenation.com/article/secret-courts-exploit-immigrants; 
Jacqueline Stevens, Lawless Courts, NATION (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.thenation.
com/article/155497/lawless-courts. Stevens is one of the authors of this Article. 
 95. See Jacqueline Stevens, Atlanta Immigration Judge Sics Guards on 
Professor/Writer Who Revealed Improprieties, STATES WITHOUT NATIONS (Apr. 25, 
2010), https://stateswithoutnations.blogspot.com/2010/04/atlanta-immigration-judg
e-sics-guards.html (providing a contemporaneous account of the attempt to observe 
immigration hearings). 
 96. Brief for Appellant at 4, Stevens v. Lynch, No. 1:12-CV-1352-ODE, 2016 WL 
10950435 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 29, 2016) (No. 16-12007-DD). 
 97. Id. at *18. 
 98. Id. at *9. 
 99. Id. at *10. 
 100. Id. (“Guard Hayes that afternoon reported the event to the Federal Protective 
Service’s Battle Creek Mega Center Operator and stated that he had no idea why 
Cassidy ordered him to remove Stevens and he was later told ‘they are trying to ban 
her from the building.’”) (internal citations omitted). FOIA Case NPPD 10F202 (Sept. 
27, 2011), https://deportationresearchclinic.org/NPPD-FOIA-10F202MegaCenter.pd
f. 
 101. Brief for Appellees at *19, Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(No. 16-12007-DD) (“The district court correctly held that maintaining control of the 
decorum, sanctity, and security of the courtroom constitutes a function normally 
performed by a judge.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 102. 438 U.S. 478, 512–13 (1978). 
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that is part of their judicial functions.103 Picking up on a point made 
sua sponte by the district court judge,104 the government argued 
that ordering people removed from a courthouse was a “function 
normally performed by a judge” and that “the removal here came in 
the context of Appellant ‘deal[ing] with the judge in his judicial 
capacity.’”105 
A majority of the three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit 
held that “Immigration Judges are judges entitled to absolute 
immunity for their judicial acts, without regard to the motive with 
which those acts are allegedly performed.”106 The panel then 
established that the standard for evaluating the facts was whether 
Cassidy “acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’”107 Because 
IJs “have an obligation to maintain control over the courthouse and 
over the conduct of persons in the courthouse; the issuance of an 
order removing persons from the courthouse in the interest of 
maintaining such control is an ordinary function performed by 
judges . . . .”108 The court further held that “immunity bars 
 
 103. Brief for Appellees at *13–14, Stevens, 877 F.3d 1293 (No. 16-12007-DD) 
(“Citing to Butz, 483 U.S. at 512–13, the district court correctly held that, because 
the Supreme Court has unequivocally determined that ‘those who participate in 
[adjudication within a federal administrative agency] should also be immune from 
suits for damages,’ absolute judicial immunity extends to Appellee IJ Cassidy as an 
adjudicator within a federal administrative agency.”) (internal citation omitted); id. 
at *19 (“Assuming arguendo, as the district court did, that any removal of Appellant 
from the building actually occurred, it stemmed from Appellant’s previous 
interaction with Appellee IJ Cassidy inside his courtroom as part of Appellant’s effort 
to observe a case on Cassidy’s docket. As such, IJ Cassidy acted in his judicial 
capacity and within his jurisdiction.”) (internal citations omitted). The 
administrative law judge (ALJ) referenced in Butz is a creature of the Administrative 
Procedures Act, in contrast with the “administrative judge” (AJ). 
 104. Stevens v. Lynch, No. 1:12-CV-1352-ODE, 2016 WL 10950435, at *4 (N.D. 
Ga. Feb. 29, 2016) (“Judge Cassidy was judicially immune from Plaintiff’s suit for 
injunctive relief because he was acting within his judicial capacity when he ordered 
her to be removed from the courtroom and the Atlanta Immigration Court building.”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 105. Brief for Appellees at *19, Stevens, 877 F.3d 1293 (No. 16-12007-DD) (quoting 
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)). 
 106. Stevens, 877 F.3d at 1304. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1305. To support its analysis, the court cited “Sheppard v. Maxwell, 
384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (‘the courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the 
control of the court’); United States v. Smith, 426 F.3d 567, 569, 576 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(stressing the importance that the judiciary -- not the Marshals Service -- play the 
primary role in controlling access to federal buildings containing courtrooms); United 
States v. Ulan, 421 F.2d 787, 788 (2d Cir. 1970) (appeal from a conviction for 
assaulting and interfering with a U.S. Deputy Marshal, which arose after a district 
court judge ordered the Marshals to clear the courtroom and to escort all 
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injunctive relief against Immigration Judges”109 and stressed the 
inconvenience to the IJs of having to defend their actions in federal 
court and the “chilling” effect this might have on their conduct.110 
The order focused on a portion of a regulation authorizing IJs 
to rule on the admission of evidence, rule on objections, and control 
the hearing and failed to engage Plaintiff’s arguments on the 
express statutory limits on the contempt authority of IJs.111 Nor did 
the order address the factual disputes about the circumstances of 
Cassidy closing the hearings,112 previous occasions in which the 
plaintiff was barred because of hearings being cancelled or dockets 
not posted, or the Eleventh Circuit precedent cited in the appeal 
 
demonstrators outside the courthouse); Richman v. Sheahan, 512 F.3d 876, 880 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (a state court judge ordered the son of a woman contesting a traffic ticket 
to leave the court building and, when he refused, ordered court security officers to 
arrest the man for contempt); United States v. Brugnara, 856 F.3d 1198, 1205 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (district court judge ordered a belligerent juror removed from the 
building); State v. Bush, 714 P.2d 818, 823 (Ariz. 1986) (‘the trial judge has the 
primary responsibility for controlling the conduct of spectators in the courtroom and 
the courthouse’ and, if necessary, ‘may clear the courtroom and the courthouse of 
those who may be intimidating witnesses or other court personnel.’).” Id. at 1305–
06. 
 109. Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 110. Id. at 1308–09 (“Litigation puts the weight of time, trouble, and expense on 
the attacked judge whether the plaintiff seeks damages or an injunction at the end 
of the action. To be entangled in litigation is a distraction and more. Also, if a plaintiff 
wins an injunction, the judge faces the threat of more time, trouble, and expense of 
defending against accusations that the judge is later in violation of the injunction 
and faces the threat of contempt punishments, including incarceration maybe. We 
stress that it is the threat of private parties instituting actions and proceedings (and 
not just the possibility that the judge will be a losing party in those 
actions/proceedings) that carries with it the chilling potential for judges as they 
work.”). 
 111. Brief for Appellant, Stevens v. Lynch, No. 16-12007-DD (11th Cir. Jul. 20, 
2016), 2016 WL 3964938, at *19 (“Congress has not granted immigration judges any 
general authority to maintain the dignity of courtrooms or other federal facilities. 
Crucially, unlike federal or state judges, immigration judges’ contempt authority is 
limited to monetary sanctions, and does not extend to physical control over 
individuals. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(1). An immigration judge has far less statutory 
authority than a U.S. Magistrate, and even a U.S. Magistrate’s contempt authority 
would not extend to expelling a citizen from public building. 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(2) 
(magistrate contempt authority limited to controlling ‘misbehavior of any person in 
the magistrate judge’s presence so as to obstruct the administration of justice.’)”). A 
regulation that authorizes IJs to rule on objections and the substantive content of 
proceedings cannot be used to override express statutory restrictions on IJ authority 
to order force against third parties, if one adheres to the judicial philosophy of Coke, 
Locke, and Jefferson. 
 112. Id. at *9 (“Stevens asked Cassidy if the respondent had asked for a closed 
hearing. Cassidy responded: ‘No -- the respondent is pro se.’”). 
2019] The Case Against Absolute Judicial Immunity 333 
 
obligating a third party to object to an order for a closed hearing in 
real-time in order to preserve the right to pursue injunctive relief.113 
This obligation conflicts with the rationale for Cassidy’s order to 
remove Stevens from the building, which was based on the inference 
that questioning the basis for a closed hearing threatened the 
sanctity of court proceedings.114 
Judge Kathleen Williams concurred in the result because 
“according to Professor Stevens’ own allegations, she was removed 
from the building after she did not immediately comply with IJ 
Cassidy’s order to exit his courtroom so a sealed matter could 
proceed.”115 However, she “disagree[d] with the blanket assertion 
that for judicial immunity purposes, ordering persons removed from 
the courthouse is an obligation for judges and an ordinary function 
performed by judges.”116 She was concerned that “the facts of this 
case amply demonstrate that the Atlanta Immigration Court’s 
administrative procedures did not provide an avenue for 
meaningful review to safeguard Professor Stevens’ rights, 
especially in light of her history with IJ Cassidy and the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review.”117 The “majority’s analysis of IJ 
Cassidy’s entitlement to judicial immunity has the potential to 
 
 113. Reply Brief of Appellant, Stevens v. Lynch, No. 16-12007-DD (11th Cir. Oct. 
17, 2016), 2016 WL 8470209, at *19 n.11 (citing United States v. Valenti, 987 F.2d 
708, 713 (11th Cir. 1993). The reply motion did not quote from Valenti. The pro se 
petition for en banc review states: “Her request for a legal reason for Cassidy asking 
her to leave the courtroom, far from being grounds for him ordering force, is a 
question the Eleventh Circuit requires to preserve standing for injunctive relief.” 
Stevens v. Sessions, Petition for En Banc Review, 16-12007, at 9 (Jan. 29, 2018) 
(citing United States v. Valenti, 987 F.2d 708, 713 (11th Cir. 1993) (“The opportunity 
for the press and the public to be heard on the question of their exclusion ‘extends 
no farther than the persons actually present at the time the motion for closure is 
made, for the alternative would require substantial delays in trial and pretrial 
proceedings while notice was given to the public.’”) (internal citations omitted)). 
 114. Reply Brief of Appellant, Stevens, No. 16-12007-DD, at *19 n.11. 
 115. Stevens, 877 F.3d at 1314. The plaintiff disputed that there was any “sealed 
matter.” See Stevens, Brief for Appellant at *38, supra note 96. (“The District Court’s 
non-committal factual finding (‘likely complied’) is further abuse of discretion: even 
giving the District Court the benefit of the doubt, and treating its ‘dismissal’ as if it 
were a granting of a motion of summary judgment, the District Court should have 
viewed the evidence in a light most favorable to Stevens, in which case it would have 
found that Cassidy had habitually failed to state on the record his reasons for the 
closure of proceedings.”). In its Answer, the Government “admits that at no point did 
Plaintiff indicate she would refuse Cassidy’s request.” Stevens v. Sessions, Petition 
for En Banc Review, 16-12007, at 9 (Jan. 29, 2018) (internal quotation omitted). 
 116. Stevens, 877 F.3d at 1313. 
 117. Id. at 1315. 
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undermine the constitutional right of open access to public 
proceedings.”118 The analysis in the 2017 Eleventh Circuit panel 
decision represents a sharp attack on the constitutional right of 
access to immigration hearings and a departure from prior cases. 
An explanation of the specific problems with the Eleventh Circuit’s 
analysis will be reviewed in Part V, following an extensive review 
in Parts IV and V of the relevant underlying legislative and case 
law. 
IV. Legislative, Regulatory, and Case Law Relevant to 
Claims of Absolute Judicial Immunity for Immigration 
Judges 
Federal statutes and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
grant judges summary contempt powers in modern 
jurisprudence.119 Numerous state and federal statutes further 
elaborate the contempt orders courts have available for penalizing 
or punishing people without the protections of a jury trial.120 
Congress has expressly confined IJ contempt authority to civil 
fines.121 As detailed in Part V, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
courts cannot expand judicial contempt powers beyond those 
specified by Congress and has provided pain-staking detail on the 
legislative history behind this limitation.122 The legislative record 
discussed below indicates that Congress paid close attention to 
questions of contempt powers and reveals that Congress refused to 
pass legislation authorizing IJs to order force against third parties 
despite multiple opportunities to do so.123 The Eleventh Circuit’s 
order thus grants an authority to IJs in direct opposition to 
legislative intent. 
The plain meaning of the sections empowering IJs 
circumscribes their contempt authority, in contrast with the powers 
granted to other Article I or Article II judges. Removal proceedings 
are governed by section 1229a of Title 8 of the U.S. Code.124 Section 
1229a(b)(1), “Authority of Immigration Judge,” gives the IJ 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. See infra Part V.B.2.a. 
 120. See infra Part V.B.2.a. 
 121. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1). 
 122. See infra Part V. 
 123. See infra Part V. 
 124. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2019). 
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“authority (under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General) 
to sanction by civil money penalty any action (or inaction) in 
contempt of the judge’s proper exercise of authority under this 
chapter.”125 The Attorney General has not issued regulations 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b).  
In contrast with 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 401, 
“Power of Court,” states that “[a] court of the United States [under 
Article III] shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or 
both, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none 
other as, 1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near 
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice . . . .”126 Congress 
has provided broader contempt authorities to other courts as well, 
including the Court of Veteran Appeals, further evidence that 
Congress is perfectly capable of extending these powers to IJs and 
yet has withheld them.127 That Congress has provided summary 
contempt powers to other courts and neglected to do so here is 
indicative of Congress’ intent to prohibit IJs from exercising the 
same authority.128 
The Eleventh Circuit order in Stevens cited numerous cases of 
judges ordering force against third parties pursuant to their 
contempt powers.129 In the petition for en banc review, the plaintiff 
noted the panel’s failure to consider that the precedent refers to 
contempt powers created by legislatures, not the judiciary.130 
 
 125. § 1229a(b)(1). 
 126. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2019). 18 U.S.C. § 401 also allows judges to punish by their 
contempt powers: “(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; 
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or 
command.” 
 127. 38 U.S.C. § 7265 (2019) (“Contempt authority; assistance to the Court (a) The 
Court shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment such contempt of its 
authority as—(1) misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to 
obstruct the administration of justice . . . .”). 
 128. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) 
(a statute “specifying who may use § 506(c) -- ‘the trustee’” is sufficient to exclude 
others from claiming that prerogative). 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1), by expressly allowing 
civil contempt authority, reciprocally prohibits the summary criminal contempt 
powers Congress has granted to other judges. 
 129. See Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1305 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 130. Petition for En Banc Review, supra note 113, at 8 n.5 (“Lauf v. E.G. Shinner 
& Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) (There can be no question of the power of Congress 
thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States.’) 
(internal quotations omitted)); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) 
(‘Every other court created by the general government derives its jurisdiction wholly 
from the authority of Congress. That body may give, withhold or restrict such 
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Further, Congress has not expressly denied these powers to judges, 
though it has placed limits on the contempt powers of IJs.131 The 
petition for en banc review pointed out that in Gregory v. 
Thompson,132 the sentence immediately following the one the panel 
quoted in support of its position is: “A judge’s criminal contempt 
power provides him with the judicial muscle to cope with such 
situations, and the exercise of that power, clearly judicial in 
character, falls within the scope of the immunity doctrine.”133 The 
petitioner’s brief argued that in withholding this power from IJs, 
Congress also was withholding any shield of immunity for actions 
resembling those of bona fide judges who do hold summary 
contempt powers by statute or otherwise.134 The petition for en banc 
review was denied on April 11, 2018.135 
 
A. Immigration Hearings and Courts: Congressional and 
Administrative History   
The gulf between the plain language of the law limiting IJs 
from the corporal powers over third parties and the Eleventh 
 
jurisdiction at its discretion, provided it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed 
by the Constitution.’); United States v. Welch, 154 F.2d 705, 706 (3d Cir. 1946) 
(‘Section 268 of the Judicial Code limits the power of district courts to punish for 
contempt.’); Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. 4, p. 284–85 (‘To this head, of summary 
proceedings, may also be referred the method, immemorially used by superior courts 
of justice, of punishing contempts by attachment, and the subsequent proceedings 
thereon. The contempts that are punished, are either direct, which openly insult or 
resist the powers of the courts, or the persons of the judges who preside 
there . . . .Some of these contempts may arise in the face of the court; as by rude and 
contumelious behavior; by obstinacy, perverseness, or prevarication; by breach of the 
peace, or by any wilful disturbance whatever . . . .’)”). 
 131. Petition for En Banc Review, supra note 113, at 7–8 (“Whatever may have 
been the earlier expressions of doubt as to the constitutional authority of Congress 
to curtail this ‘inherent’ contempt power of the courts, it is now well-settled that the 
district court could not go beyond the statutory boundaries of 18 U.S.C. § 401 in 
imposing summary punishment for a criminal contempt.”) (quoting Farese v. United 
States, 209 F.2d 312, 315 (1st Cir. 1954)). 
 132. 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 133. Id. at 64 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
 134. Petition for En Banc Review, supra note 113, at 6–9. 
 135. Stevens v. Sessions, Docket No. 16-12007 (11th Cir. Apr. 11, 2018) (“[N]o 
Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be 
polled, the Petition(s) for Rehearing En Banc” were denied). It is not known whether 
Judge Kathleen Williams, sitting by designation, who wrote the concurring opinion 
highlighting the absence of a remedy, was polled for the petition. See Stevens v. 
Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2017). 
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Circuit order prompts some head-scratching. One explanation for 
the panel’s confusion is the vast discrepancy between the law and 
legislative history that created immigration courts, immigration 
“judges,” hearing room optics, and agency nomenclature. Props and 
titles from judicial bodies have been superimposed on an 
administrative agency that is part of a law enforcement agency. 
This has the Orwellian effect of implying judicial functions that far 
exceed those the law itself affords. IJs have a great deal of discretion 
to make findings of fact and issue orders of removal or adjustments 
to immigration status.136 But this discretion is not at all unique to 
this position. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
and State Department agents employ adjudicator attorneys who 
exercise discretion on the basis of case law to make decisions that 
allow or prohibit entrance to the United States.137 There is a great 
deal of discretion and thus variation in their final decisions,138 
applicants have a right to be accompanied by an attorney,139 and 
the outcomes of the USCIS decisions are subject to review, just like 
the decisions of IJs.140 
The contemporary immigration court reviewing an asylum 
denial is much closer to the office desk of the nineteenth century 
hearing officer than many realize. If one focuses on case law and 
statutes, and ignores the props of the dais and the robe, the IJ in 
downtown New York City in 2019 looks a lot more like an 
 
 136. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208; 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (1996); 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2009). IJs are 
administrative agents acting on behalf of the Attorney General, exercising discretion 
on behalf of the Attorney General. 
 137. Adjudicator’s Field Manual, USCIS.GOV, https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docVie
w/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2019); State, Foreign Affairs 
Manual and Foreign Affairs Handbook, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, https://fam.state.gov/ 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2019). 
 138. See generally JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES, ANDREW IAN SCHOENHOLTZ & PHILIP G. 
SCHRAG, REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2009) (showing substantial variation among USCIS 
officers and EOIR attorneys in rates of granting asylum after controlling for several 
variables of applicant demographics). 
 139. Asylum Interviews FAQ, USCIS.GOV, https://www.uscis.gov/faq-page/asylum
-interviews-faq#t12833n40057 (“You have the right to bring an attorney or 
representative. The attorney or representative must have filed or bring with him a 
Form G-28, which states that he or she is your attorney.”) (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). 
 140. Types of Asylum Decisions, USCIS.GOV, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian
/refugees-asylum/asylum/types-asylum-decisions (“If we cannot approve an asylum 
claim, we will send you a letter of explanation and a Form I-862, Notice to Appear, 
indicating the date and time you are scheduled to appear in court.”) (last visited Apr. 
2, 2019). 
338 Law & Inequality [Vol. 37: 2 
 
immigration officer at Ellis Island in 1919 than a federal district 
court judge, or even a traffic court judge. Case law has allowed 
Congress and the agencies implementing immigration policy broad 
and even unreviewable latitude to effect ‘national sovereignty.’141 
The purpose was to ensure that the final court of review for 
immigration policies would be no court at all, but rather agencies 
under the direction of leaders appointed by the President.142 In the 
last 125 years, Congress and the agencies have tinkered with the 
nomenclature of the functions and the titles, producing an overlay 
of what seems like judicial discretion for IJs, but this authority 
remains tethered firmly to the prerogatives of the Attorney 
General.143 
As passages from historical statutes make clear, broad 
discretion approved by the judiciary for hearings at ports of entry 
have become institutionalized in federal buildings in the interior. 
Of special note is that the procedures Congress crafted in the late 
nineteenth century and thereafter track the nomenclature of the 
1789 Judiciary Act, including contempt powers.144 A legislative 
 
 141. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. Law No. 104-208 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)) (1996). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. Attorney General orders certifying selected immigration cases for review 
tied to specific policy objectives of the Trump administration have outraged 
immigration attorneys and scholars under the Trump administration, but in fact 
goes back to a practice that was always available by statute and made use of by A.G. 
Michael Mukasey in 2008.  Laura S. Trice, Adjudication by Fiat: The Need for 
Procedural Safeguards in Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals 
Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1766, 1767 (2010)  (“Exercising his power to review 
decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the Attorney General used a 
brief, unpublished BIA decision, Silva- Trevino, as a vehicle to completely rewrite 
longstanding precedent governing "crimes involving moral turpitude.”) (internal 
citation omitted). See also Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive 
Branch Immigration Policy through the Attorney General's Review Authority, 101 
Iowa L. Rev. 841, 922 (2016); Catherine Y. Kim, The President's Immigration Courts, 
68 Emory L.J. 1, 48 (2018); Catherine Y. Kim & Amy Semet, An Empirical Study of 
Political Control Over Immigration Adjudication,  GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3348681. 
 144. See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 13, 
17 1 Stat. 73, 80–83 (1789) (“Sec. 17. And be it further enacted, That all the said 
courts of the United States shall have power to grant new trials, in cases where there 
has been a trial by jury for reasons for which new trials have usually been granted 
in the courts of law; and shall have power to impose and administer all necessary 
oaths or affirmations, and to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said 
courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same; and to 
make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting of business in the 
said courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States.”). 
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record exists and judges can compare side-by-side the authorities 
Congress afforded to Article III judges with those Congress denied 
IJs and other administrative judges.145 The string of cases that 
ignore these statutes and rely on vague ideas about how ‘courts 
function and the prerogatives inferred implicitly or explicitly from 
‘inherent judicial powers,’ impute Article III powers to other courts 
or officials. They therefore substitute the preferences, biases, and 
beliefs of sitting judges for laws Congress passed. 
Especially important is that these departures from positive 
law are not based on findings that the laws are unconstitutional or 
absurd. Nor do these decisions rely on statutes for their findings. as 
to whether a defendant’s actions are part of their official 
functions.146 The black letter history of immigration review below 
exposes the distinction between the appearance of a judicial context 
and the true nature of immigration proceedings.147 The discretion 
of immigration officials described below is in service of the 
immigration priorities of the Executive Branch, an obscure policy 
path that has become more visible in recent months under the 
Trump administration. 
B. Immigration Office and Inspection Powers, 1875 to 1917 
The earliest administrative measures to screen those arriving 
at ports of entry focused on shipping ports and were enforced by the 
“director of the port at which [the vessel] arrives.”148 The 1875 
statute prohibited “any alien” from leaving an arriving vessel until 
after it had been inspected, and gave federal courts jurisdiction to 
hear challenges.149 The early procedures authorized a single agent 
to make an evidentiary finding of exclusion and provided for appeals 
of these findings in federal courts.150 In 1882, Congress continued 
 
 145. See generally Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication 
of Immigration Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1501 (2010) (discussing the differences between 
executive branch IJs and Article III federal judges). 
 146. See infra Part V. 
 147. See infra Part IV.B–C, V. 
 148. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 43 Stat. 477 (1875). 
 149. Id. at 478 (“If any person shall feel aggrieved by the certificate of such 
inspecting officer stating him or her to be within either of the classes whose 
immigration is forbidden by this section, and shall apply for release or other remedy 
to any proper court or judge, then it shall be the duty of the collector at said port of 
entry to detain said vessel until a hearing and determination of the matter are 
had . . . .”). 
 150. Id. 
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to charge the Secretary of the Treasury with “supervision over the 
business of immigration to the United States.”151 In 1885, Congress 
first mandated a procedure for the deportation of noncitizens that 
had been determined to arrive in violation of immigration laws, but 
the procedure for this was not specified.152 
In 1887, Congress charged the Secretary of the Treasury with 
establishing rules and regulations for implementing the 
immigration law. This included “furnish[ing] instructions to the 
board, commission, or persons charged with the execution of the 
provisions of this section as to the time of procedure in respect 
thereto . . . .”153 In 1888, Congress passed “an act to prohibit the 
coming of Chinese laborers to the United States,” and established 
that the only authority to review adverse admissions decisions 
would be employees of the Treasury Department: “[T]he collector 
shall in person decide all questions in dispute with regard to the 
right of any Chinese passenger to enter the United States, and his 
decision shall be subject to review by the Secretary of the Treasury, 
and not otherwise.”154 However, those targeted for removal after 
they had been residing in the United States could be deported only 
 
 151. 1882 Immigration Act, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214, 214 (1882). The courts in this 
initial time frame were using their jurisdiction to affirm Congress’s prerogative to 
pass legislation affecting non-citizens in furtherance of ‘national sovereignty,’ and to 
give broad berth to the findings of the executive branch, regardless of putative due 
process rights asserted by those adversely affected by such legislation and its 
implementation. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (“Public 
opinion thus enlightened, brought to bear upon legislation, will do more than all 
other causes to prevent abuses; but the province of the courts is to pass upon the 
validity of laws, not to make them, and, when their validity is established, to declare 
their meaning and apply their provisions.”). Congress had not assigned final 
jurisdiction to immigration commissions, and courts still had jurisdiction to review 
these claims. 
 152. Amendment to the Alien Contract-Labor Law Contained in the Deficiency 
Bill, 25 Stat. 565 (1888) in U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, Doc. No. 1945, IMMIGRATION LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS, at 11 (May 22, 1895) (“[T]o authorize the Secretary of Treasury, in 
case that he shall be satisfied that an immigrant has been allowed to land contrary 
to the prohibition of that law, to cause such immigrant, within the period of one year 
after landing or entry, to be taken into custody and returned to the country from 
whence he came . . . .”). The one-year limit recognized that immigration authority to 
exclude was tied to an admissions process. After one year, the individual was de facto 
and thus de jure admitted. 
 153. Act to Prohibit Importation and Immigration of Foreigners and Aliens under 
Contract or Agreement to Perform Labor in the United States, the Territories, and 
the District of Columbia, Stat. 414, ch. 220, § 8  (Feb. 23, 1887) in U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, 
Doc. No. 1945, IMMIGRATION LAWS AND REGULATIONS, at 4 (May 22, 1895). 
 154. An Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Laborers to the United States, Stat. 
476, ch. 1017, § 12 (Sept. 13, 1888). 
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after a warrant sworn under oath and a hearing before a judge or 
commissioner of a federal court.155 
The 1891 act “Supervision over the business of immigration to 
the United States,” established for the first time the office of 
“superintendent of immigration” within the Department of the 
Treasury.156 It also established hearing-like powers and procedures 
for officials reviewing arriving aliens, including the “power to 
administer oaths, and to take and consider testimony touching the 
right of any such aliens to enter the United States,” and required 
this “shall be entered of record.”157 Congress stated that the 
decisions made by the inspectors “shall be final,” but also provided 
appeal to the superintendent of immigration, whose decisions were 
in turn “subject to review by the Secretary of Treasury.”158 
Ultimately, circuit and district courts of the United States had “full 
and concurrent jurisdiction of all causes, civil and criminal, arising 
under any of the provisions of this act.”159 In 1892, Congress revised 
the Chinese exclusion law and allowed cases of those entering or 
arrived to be “tried” before a “justice, judge, or commissioner” and, 
in a departure from the 1888 law, did not specify that the 
commissioner needed to belong to a state or federal court.160 
 
 155. An Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Laborers to the United States, Stat. 
476, ch. 1017, § 13 (Sept. 13, 1888) (“That any Chinese person, or person, of Chinese 
descent, found unlawfully in the United States, or. its Territories, may be arrested 
upon a warrant issued upon a complaint, under oath, filed by any party on behalf of 
the United States, by any justice, judge, or commissioner of any United States court, 
returnable before any justice, judge, or commissioner of a United States court, or 
before any United States court, and when convicted, upon a hearing, and found and 
adjudged to be one not lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States, such 
person shall be removed from the United States to the country whence he came.”). 
 156. U.S. TREAS. DEP’T Doc. No. 1945, IMMIGRATION LAWS AND REGULATIONS, at 
4 (May 22, 1895). 
 157. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, §§ 7–8, 51 Stat. 1084 (1891). 
 158. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, §§ 7–8, 51 Stat. 1084 (1891). 
 159. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 13, 51 Stat. 1086 (1891). 
 160. The Geary Act of 1892 ch. 60, § 2, 27 Stat. 25 (“That any Chinese person or 
person of Chinese descent, when convicted and adjudged under any of said laws to 
be not lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States, shall be removed from 
the United States to China, unless he or they shall make it appear to the justice, 
judge, or conmissioner before whom he or they are tried that lie or they are subjects 
or citizens of some other country, in which case he or they shall be removed front the 
United States to such country.”) (emphasis added). See also Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 723 (claiming to paraphrase Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 
130 U.S. 581, 582 (1889) in finding a Chinese laborer “might be refused readmission 
into the United States, without judicial trial or hearing, and simply by reason of 
another act of congress, passed during his absence . . . .”). The Court did not cite to 
any specific passage in the opinion and the inference seems incorrect. In fact, Chae 
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In 1893, Congress further specified that “at least three” 
inspectors must approve those whose legal status is in doubt.161 
Treasury then issued rules providing that a “special inquiry 
required by statute will be separate from the public, but any 
immigrant who is refused permission to land, or pending an appeal 
in his case, will be permitted to confer with friends or counsel in 
such manner as the commissioner may deem proper.”162 This second 
1893 regulation clarified the procedure for an appeal of the decision 
rendered by the three inspection officers, allowing both the 
dissenting inspector and the immigrant to appeal in writing “with 
all the evidence in the case and his views thereon.”163 The 
deportation was stayed pending review of the appeal.164 Though 
there was no time frame for either filing the appeal or for a decision, 
rules issued several months later stated that “[t]hose detained for 
special inquiry shall have a speedy hearing and be either discharged 
or ordered deported. If an appeal is prayed the record of the 
 
Chan Ping’s petition for a writ for habeas corpus was granted by the Northern 
District of California. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582 (“[C]ommanding [the master 
of the ship] to have the body of the appellant, with the cause of his detention, before 
the court at time and place designated . . . .”). The Chae Chan Ping Court affirmed 
that, as a conclusion of law, Ping was “not entitled to enter the United States, and 
was not unlawfully restrained of his liberty . . . .” Id. The record discussed only 
Congress’s prerogative to reverse its treaty by virtue a new law, and whether the 
previous treaty afforded Ping property or contract rights. Id. (“The objection that the 
act is in conflict with the treaties was earnestly pressed in the court below, and the 
answer to it constitutes the principal part of its opinion. Here the objection made is 
that the act of 1888 impairs a right vested under the treaty of 1880, as a law of the 
United States, and the statutes of 1882 and of 1884 passed in execution of it. It must 
be conceded that the act of 1888 is in contravention of express stipulations of the 
treaty of 1868, and of the supplemental treaty of 1880, but it is not on that account 
invalid, or to be restricted in its enforcement. The treaties were of no greater legal 
obligation than the act of congress. By the constitution, laws made in pursuance 
thereof, and treaties made under the authority of the United States, are both 
declared to be the supreme law of the land, and no paramount authority is given to 
one over the other.”) (internal citations omitted). Ping did not complain that he was 
turned back without a trial, but that the criteria for his admission had changed 
unlawfully. Id. The Court invoked the Constitution only to declare Congress can 
supersede treaties and was silent on the question of whether in doing so the 
substance of the law violated Ping’s Sixth or Seventh Amendment rights. Id. 
 161. Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 206, § 5, 27 Stat. 569 (1893) (“[N]o immigrant shall 
be admitted on special inquiry except after a favorable decision made by at least 
three of said inspectors; and any decision to admit shall be subject to appeal by any 
dissenting inspector to the Superintendent of Immigration . . . .”). 
 162. U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION, Art. 4, at 4 (Apr. 25, 1893). 
 163. U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION, Art. 6–7, at 4. 
 164. U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION, Art. 6–7, at 4. 
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proceedings shall at once be transmitted to the Superintendent of 
Immigration at Washington.”165 
By 1913, Congress had empowered immigration officers to 
formally administer oaths and moved jurisdiction over immigration 
to the Commissioner General of Immigration within the 
Department of Labor.166 Hearings to determine “whether an alien 
who has been duly held shall be allowed to land or shall be deported” 
were to take place in ports of arrival before local boards of three 
members comprised of immigration inspectors.167 Dissent by a third 
inspector or the noncitizen could be appealed to the newly 
established Secretary of Labor, whose decision would be “final.” 
Section 27 specified the jurisdiction of federal courts over appeals of 
the agency decision based on violations of due process or other 
rights provided by the Constitution.168 
Congress required initial hearings be held in secret, and the 
sole mechanism of accountability was a documentary record of 
proceedings: “All hearings before boards shall be separate and apart 
from the public, but the said boards shall keep a complete 
permanent record of their proceedings and of all such testimony as 
may be produced before them . . . .”169 The Department of Labor 
continued to abide by rules from 1907 for providing more formal 
hearings, including an “oath of office” for those appointed to a board, 
and a prompt, mandatory hearing with “due regard being had to the 
 
 165. U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, BUR. OF IMMIGRATION, MAINTENANCE AND DEPORTATION 
OF ALIEN IMMIGRANTS, at 19–20, Rule 2 (Nov. 29, 1893). 
 166. U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, REGULATIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF LABOR §§ 24–25, 34 
Stat. 898 (Feb. 20, 1907) (amended by Acts of Mar. 26, 1910, 36 Stat. 263 and Mar. 
4, 1913). 
 167. U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, REGULATIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF LABOR § 25, 34 Stat. 
898 (Feb. 20, 1907) (“Each board shall consist of three members, who shall be selected 
from such of the immigrant officials in the service as the Commissioner General of 
Immigration, with the approval of the Secretary of Labor, shall from time to time 
designate as qualified to serve on such boards: Provided, That at ports where there 
are fewer than three immigrant inspectors, the Secretary of Labor, upon the 
recommendation of the Commissioner General of Immigration, may designate other 
United States officials for service on such boards of special inquiry.”). 
 168. U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, REGULATIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF LABOR § 27, 34 Stat. 
898 (Feb. 20, 1907) (“That no suit or proceeding for a violation of the provisions of 
this act shall be settled, compromised, or discontinued without the consent of the 
court in which it is pending, entered of record, with the reasons therefor.”). 
 169. U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION, Rule 17, subd. 7, at 35 
(Nov. 15, 1911) (“Forwarding appeal record – The complete appeal record shall be 
forwarded promptly to the bureau with the views in writing of the immigration 
officer in charge.”) (emphasis in original). 
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necessity of giving the alien a fair hearing” (a reference to the 
prerogative of providing time for the securing of documents and 
witnesses in advance of the formal hearing).170 
In 1917, Congress passed omnibus immigration legislation 
governing agencies that would remain largely intact until 1952.171 
There were small changes to the protocols for hearings of those 
arriving and under review for deportation.172 Instead of three 
inspectors, each arriving immigrant would be reviewed by “at least 
two immigrant inspectors at the discretion of the Secretary of Labor 
and under such regulations as he may prescribe.”173 The inspectors 
were again authorized to administer oaths and to “take and 
consider evidence touching the right of any alien to enter, reenter, 
pass through, or reside in the United States, and, where such action 
may be necessary, to make a written record of such evidence . . . .”174 
The 1917 Act empowered “[a]ny commissioner of immigration or 
inspector in charge” to subpoena witnesses and compel testimony 
of witnesses before said inspectors and the production of books, 
papers, and documents touching the right of any alien to enter, 
reenter, reside in, or pass through the United States, and to 
that end may invoke the aid of any court of the United 
States . . . and any failure to obey such order of the court may 
be punished by the court as a contempt thereof.175  
As is the case today, the officials holding hearings could enlist the 
assistance of courts and their punitive contempt powers, but 
Congress did not bestow these powers on the inspectors.176 
To provide a check on the arrivals of those unqualified and to 
allow those refused admission an appeal, Congress authorized the 
 
 170. U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION, at 21 (Nov. 15, 1911) 
(“Immigration Rules of November 15, 1911. The act entitled ‘An act to regulate the 
immigration of aliens into the United States,’ approved February 20, 1907, is the 
immigration act or law referred to in the following (revised) rules. All numbered 
sections mentioned in the rules refer to those of said act unless stated to the contrary. 
These rules apply to aliens seeking admission to each and every portion of the United 
States except the Philippine Islands, in which territory the immigration laws are 
administered by officers of the general government of those islands.”); U.S. TREAS. 
DEP’T, REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION, Rule 15, subd. 1–3, at 33. 
 171. An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens to, and the Residence of Aliens 
in the United States, Pub. L. No. 301 (1917); Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, 39 
Stat. 874, 898 (overriding the veto of President Woodrow Wilson). 
 172. Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 874. 
 173. Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 16, 39 Stat. 874, 886. 
 174. Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 16, 39 Stat. 874, 886. 
 175. Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 16, 39 Stat. 874, 886. 
 176. Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 16, 39 Stat. 874, 886. 
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detention of arriving immigrants and established a board of special 
inquiry that also was not contemplated as a court: 
In the event of rejection by the board of special inquiry, in all 
cases where an appeal to the Secretary of Labor is permitted by 
this Act, the alien shall be so informed and shall have the right 
to be represented by counsel or other adviser on such appeal. 
The decision of an immigrant inspector, if favorable to the 
admission of any alien, shall be subject to challenge by any 
other immigrant inspector, and such challenge shall operate to 
take the alien whose right to land is so challenged before a 
board of special inquiry for its investigation.177 
These boards were to provide “prompt determination of all cases of 
immigrants detained at such ports under the provisions of the law” 
and were to “consist of three members . . . selected from such of the 
immigrant officials in the service as the Commissioner General of 
Immigration, with the approval of the Secretary of Labor, shall from 
time to time designate as qualified to serve on such boards.”178 They 
had the power to decide on which arriving immigrants could land 
and which would be deported.179  
Congress reiterated with small changes its previous 
language requiring the hearings to be non-public and that an 
immigrant could be accompanied by someone of their choosing.180 
The 1917 Act also specified that duties of those implementing the 
law were of an “administrative character”181 and, for the first time, 
Congress referred to these inquiries as a “proceeding.”182 
 
 177. Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 16, 39 Stat. 874, 886–87. 
 178. Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 17, 39 Stat. 874, 887. 
 179. Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 17, 39 Stat. 874, 887. 
 180. Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 17, 39 Stat. 874, 887 (“All hearings 
before such boards shall be separate and apart from the public, but the immigrant 
may have one friend or relative present under such regulations as may be prescribed 
by the Secretary of Labor.”). 
 181. Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 22, 39 Stat. 874, 892 (“The duties 
of commissioners of immigration and other immigration officials in charge of 
districts, ports, or stations shall be of an administrative character, to be prescribed 
in detail by regulations prepared under the direction or with the approval of the 
Secretary of Labor”). Section 25 again affirmed that federal district courts had “full 
jurisdiction” over cases arising from the Act and additionally stated, “That no suit or 
proceeding for a violation of the provisions of this Act shall be settled, compromised, 
or discontinued without the consent of the court in which it is pending, entered of 
record, with the reasons therefor.” Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 25, 39 
Stat. 874, 893. 
 182. Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 25, 39 Stat. 874, 893 (“Such boards 
shall keep a complete permanent record of their proceedings and of all such 
testimony as may be produced before them . . . ”). 
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C. Immigration Office and Inspection Powers, 1917–1952 
The most significant legislative measure passed in this time 
frame that affected the due process rights of those in deportation 
proceedings was the 1951 Appropriations Act,183 which slipped 
through Congress in the wake of a 1950 Supreme Court case 
granting a habeas petition and overturning a deportation order.184 
The Court held that the failure of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) to organize its proceedings in 
compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)185 
violated the respondent’s right to due process: 
But if hearings are to be had before employees whose 
responsibility and authority derives from a lesser source, they 
must be examiners whose independence and tenure are so 
guarded by the Act as to give the assurances of neutrality which 
Congress thought would guarantee the impartiality of the 
administrative process. We find no basis in the purposes, 
history or text of this Act for judicially declaring an exemption 
in favor of deportation proceedings from the procedural 
safeguards enacted for general application to administrative 
agencies. We hold that deportation proceedings must conform 
to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act if 
resulting orders are to have validity. Since the proceeding in 
the case before us did not comply with these requirements, we 
sustain the writ of habeas corpus and direct release of the 
prisoner.186 
The Court noted discrepancies between the protocols of deportation 
hearings and the due process protections of the APA sufficient to 
overturn a deportation order. The Eleventh Circuit panel in Stevens 
found otherwise. It held that the “structure of immigration 
proceedings contains many safeguards—similar (although not 
always identical) to those discussed in Butz in the context of 
administrative hearings—that tend to reduce the risk of unchecked 
unconstitutional conduct by Immigration Judges.”187 The Eleventh 
Circuit panel made no mention of Wong Yang Sung, nor did it 
 
 183. An Act Making Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending 
June 30, 1951, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 81-843, 64 Stat. 1044 (Sept. 27, 
1950). 
 184. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). 
 185. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) 
(codified as amended 5 U.S.C. § 500. 
 186. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 52–53. 
 187. Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1302 (11th Cir. 2017). 
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evaluate the points in Butz that emphasized the protections specific 
to the APA.188 
The APA created a due process right to a hearing in claims 
governed by the APA. The DOJ could have followed the Court’s 
order in Wong Yang Sung and created administrative law judges as 
provided for in the APA. If the DOJ had needed additional funds to 
do so, it could have gone to Congress and, pointing to the Court’s 
ruling, requested additional monies from the next appropriations 
bill. 
Rather than comply with the Court order to bring deportation 
hearings in line with the APA, the DOJ, expressly asked Congress 
to exempt deportation hearings from the APA in the next 
appropriations hearing. Senator McCarran noted that “Sung 
invalidated the system previously used by the Immigration Service” 
and asked about the effect of the decision.189 Mr. Miller of the DOJ 
called the requirement a “very perplexing phase,”190 and estimated 
a future cost $150,000,000 due to the increase in immigration from 
Mexico:  
Probably in 10 years we could give hearings to a half million 
applicants, we will say. But we will possibly have a million next 
year and following years. That problem is increasing from a 
trickle of 10,000 in the last 10 years to this figure that I have 
just given you. 191 
There was no further substantive discussion. 
On September 27, 1950, as part of the Public Law on 
Appropriations, Congress passed two measures under the heading 
“General Provisions—Department of Justice.”192 One included 
supplemental funding to pay for 200 additional passenger vehicles 
 
 188. See Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1643 (2016) (arguing proceedings conducted by administrative judges lack due 
process, with special criticisms of IJs). 
 189. Making Appropriations for the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and 
the Judiciary for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1951: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on S. Comm. on Appropriations, 81st Cong. 988 (1950). 
 190. Making Appropriations for the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and 
the Judiciary for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1951: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on S. Comm. on Appropriations, 81st Cong. 988 (1950). 
 191. Making Appropriations for the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and 
the Judiciary for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1951: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on S. Comm. on Appropriations, 81st Cong. 988 (1950). 
 192. An Act Making Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending 
June 30, 1951, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 81-843, 64 Stat. 1044 (Sept. 27, 
1950). 
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for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.193 The second stated: 
“Proceedings under law relating to the exclusion or expulsion of 
aliens shall hereafter be without regard to the provisions of sections 
5, 7, and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 1004, 1006, 
1007).”194 Since that decision, there have been a number of changes 
in the rules for immigration hearings. In 1987, the agency removed 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deposition requirements from 
its rules of evidence.195 This change allows the government to 
introduce third party statements by ICE agents with few 
protections of authentication or review, a special problem for pro se 
respondents. 
Reiterating the Court’s analysis in Wong Yang Sung, law 
professors, attorneys, and IJs have been decrying the lack of 
independence of immigration courts in contrast with Article III 
courts and those governed by the Administrative Procedures Act for 
decades.196 According to law professor Peter Levinson, 
 
 193. An Act Making Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending 
June 30, 1951, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 81-843, 64 Stat. 1048 (Sept. 27, 
1950). 
 194. An Act Making Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending 
June 30, 1951, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 81-843, 64 Stat. 1048 (Sept. 27, 
1950). 
 195. Compare Evidence, 22 Fed. Reg. 9797 (Dec. 6, 1957) (codified at 8 C.F.R. 
242.14(e) (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall be used as a guide to the extent 
practicable.”) with 52 Fed. Reg. 2934 (Jan. 29, 1987) (explaining the removal of 
certain protections: “To conform to the new rule, § 242.14(e) is deleted and replaced 
with a condensed regulation authorizing the taking of depositions in accordance with 
new rule 8 C.F.R. 3.33. This rule will provide adequate guidelines to the parties and 
preserve fundamental fairness in the hearing process without the complexity of its 
predecessor. Commentators suggested that in connection with depositions, discovery 
is desirable in these proceedings to narrow issues and gather evidence. In our view, 
this is unnecessary for proper consideration of the issues, and would unduly 
complicate these proceedings and open up a possible area of abuse and delay.”). 
 196. See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(“ . . . adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the 
minimum standards of legal justice.”); KANSTROOM, supra note 2, at 2 (“One wonders 
how those who experienced the Palmer Raids would react if they could have foreseen 
that, nearly a century later, over 325,000 people would face removal proceedings in 
a single year, many under mandatory detention, unprotected from unreasonable 
searches and selective prosecution, only a third represented by counsel and none 
with the right to appointed counsel.”); Jason Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice 
Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 TULANE L. REV. 1, 3 (2014) (“[T]he United States 
Supreme Court’s extreme deference to legislative and executive policy decisions in 
the immigration context renders selective prosecution challenges nearly 
nonjusticiable.”); Adam Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1671, 1671 (2016) (“The history of immigration jurisprudence is a history of 
obsession with judicial deference.”); Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Immigration Law—
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commissioners supervising immigration courts in 1980 leaned 
toward providing a modicum of protections in immigration 
hearings: “The need for economy and efficiency in the delivery of 
public service dictates a review of the statutory basis, if any, for the 
costly and inefficient system of so-called ‘Immigration Courts’ and 
‘Immigration Judges’ that seems to have been dictated by the cry 
for due process . . . .”197 At the same time the agency objected to the 
IJ denying access to the public, the Select Commission on 
Immigration and Refugee Policy stated its mission was 
administrative, not judicial.198 A 1977 memorandum by an official 
supervising immigration hearings seemed bemused that officials 
who, by statute were “special inquiry officers,” had begun wearing 
robes, describing them as “‘the black nightgowns they frequently 
wear when conducting hearings.’”199 In his 1980 report to the Select 
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Levinson noted 
the problems with the ad hoc hiring procedures and chain of 
command and advised “[c]hanging the position of immigration judge 
to that of administrative law judge” and hiring IJs through the 
Office of Personnel Management. This would have put the 
proceedings under the Administrative Procedure Act, while keeping 
the courts within the Department of Justice but separate from the 
INS.200 
 
Administrative Adjudication— Third and Seventh Circuits Condemn Pattern of 
Error in Immigration Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2596, 2599 (2006) (“Immigration 
judges face too many challenges with too few resources, and so they are bound to 
make mistakes.”); Stephen Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 369, 380 (2006) (reviewing “gaping exceptions to the availability of 
judicial review”); Peter Levinson, Specialized Court for Immigration Hearings and 
Appeals, 56 NOTRE DAME L. 644, 644 (1981) (“The United States immigration 
adjudication system is beset with crippling problems.”); Wasserman, supra note 16, 
at 376 (“ . . . the exercise of these discretionary powers [in deportation proceedings] 
has produced excesses of bureaucratic zeal that can only be categorized as a national 
disgrace.”). 
 197. Levinson, supra note 196, at 646 n.17 (quoting Memorandum re Association 
of Immigration Directors’ Conference with Commissioner Castillo (Dec. 14, 1977) 
(copy in Select Commission files)). 
 198. Levinson, supra note 196, at 646 n.17 (quoting Memorandum, supra note 
197). 
 199. Levinson, supra note 196, at 646 n.17. 
 200. Levinson, supra note 196, at 647–48 (citing Executive Summary, 
Consultation on Quasi-Judicial Quandaries: Over Due Process, in SELECT 
COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, 2D SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 196, 197–98 (Oct. 1980)). 
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D. Statute on Immigration Judge Powers, 1996 
The law authorizing IJs to compel civil fines was added to the 
immigration code in 1996 in the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).201 The plain text, 
legislative history, and purpose of the Act discourage an inference 
that IJs have criminal contempt powers necessary for a summary 
order to use of force against observers.202 First, the text clearly 
limits contempt powers to issuance of civil fines, with no mention of 
the authority to order force, much less custody of third parties.203 
There is extensive caselaw that Congress’s failure to permit the use 
of physical force or other criminal contempt authority indicates its 
intent to exclude those powers.204 The plain meaning of the text and 
canons of statutory interpretation precludes IJs from ordering force 
on any parties other than respondents in immigration court. 
Second, a review of the legislative history reveals no discussion 
of either problems faced by IJs in controlling their hearings or any 
need to enhance their powers in a committee hearing, floor 
statement, congressional report, or agency.205 Even the civil 
 
 201. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, § 240(b)(1) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1)) (1996). 
 202. LARRY EIG, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT 
TRENDS, REPT. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE REPORT 97-589, 1–2 (2014) (“ textualism may be the primary approach 
toward interpreting statutes . . . .”). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 16 (“‘[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a 
statute but omits it in another . . . , it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’). The Court cited 
this maxim when Congress restricted direct access by Guantanamo detainees to the 
courts but did not expressly restrict access in pending cases through petitions for 
writs of habeas corpus: ‘A familiar principle of statutory construction . . . is that a 
negative inference may be drawn from the exclusion of language from one statutory 
provision that is included in other provisions of the same statute.’ In an earlier case 
on the availability of habeas review by a convicted murderer, the Court referred to 
the history of the provision that treated habeas relief and other access to the courts 
differently: ‘[N]egative implications raised by disparate provisions are strongest 
when the portions of a statute treated differently had already been joined together 
and were being considered simultaneously when the language raising the 
implication was inserted.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 205. In introducing the legislation on March 19, 1996, Rep. David Dreir (R-CA) 
noted the upcoming general election of 1996. 142 Cong. Rec. H2362 (Mar. 19, 1996). 
(“Mr. Speaker, illegal immigration has reached crisis proportions in my State of 
California. We deal daily with a flood of illegal immigrants who are coming across 
the border seeking government services, job opportunities, and family members. 
There is simply no question that the President, for all his rhetoric, has failed to make 
this a top priority. He opposed California’s proposition 187. He vetoed legislation 
2019] The Case Against Absolute Judicial Immunity 351 
 
contempt authority of IJs on which Congress eventually voted was 
not recorded or discussed in any Congressional record associated 
with Pub. L. 104-208.206 
The first time any Congressional document referenced this 
new power is the House bill “Immigration in the National Interest 
Act of 1995.”207 The language providing the new authority amends 
Section 301 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.208 In 
addition to adding the authority to issue civil fines, the bill adds a 
new section changing the title from “special inquiry officers” to 
“immigration judges.”209 Although the changes in immigration law 
were extensive, the 104th Congress held relatively few hearings on 
the bill.210 None of the hearings included any discussion of a new 
authority for IJs and there is no reference in the record to the views 
of the agencies affected.211 In fact, the Senate bill, first introduced 
 
establishing that illegal immigrants are not entitled to Federal and State welfare 
services. He vetoed reimbursement to the States for the cost of incarcerating illegal 
immigrant felons, and his Justice Department has been woefully slow in disbursing 
to States the meager incarceration funds that were appropriated back in 1994. Mr. 
Speaker, as Members well know, California will never support a President that is 
soft on illegal immigration. Illegal immigration might just be taking center stage in 
Washington today, but the issue is like an overnight sensation in Hollywood.”); Adam 
Nagourney, Dole Unleashes His Tough Talk on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 
1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/18/us/dole-unleashes-his-tough-talk-on-
immigration.html (“‘We take California away from Clinton, he can’t win,’ said Mr. 
Dole’s campaign manager, Scott Reed . . . Immigration was one of a number of 
socially disputatious issues raised by Mr. Dole today, and in doing so he followed the 
advice of Gov. Pete Wilson, who rode the issue to re-election in 1994 . . . ‘Why are you 
paying millions in taxpayer dollars to provide drug rehabilitation for illegal 
immigrants?’ Mr. Dole said to cheers here. ‘And worse, why are thousands of 
Californians the victims of violent crimes committed by people who should have been 
stopped at the border before they so much as stepped foot in the United States of 
America.’”). 
 206. See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. H2321–2467 (Mar. 19, 1996). 
 207. H.R. 1915, 104th Cong. (June 22, 1995); H.R. 2204, 104th Cong. (1995).  
 208. H.R. 1915, 104th Cong. (June 22, 1995); H.R. 2204, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 209. Both versions include the same amendment to Title III, Subtitle D, § 352 
(“Sec. 352. Use of Term ‘‘Immigration Judge”). 
 210. See, e. g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1–4 (1995); H.R. REP. NO. 104-828 (1996) 
(Conf. Rep.). None of the related hearings and actions discuss immigration judge 
contempt authority. See, e.g., H.R. 2202–Immigration Control and Financial 
Responsibility Act of 1996, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/104th-con
gress/house-bill/2202/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2019). Presumably these sections were 
passed on to House members or staff through unofficial channels and they added it 
to the bill. 
 211. H. Rept. 104-469—Immigration in the National Interest Act of 1995 
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/104th-congress/hou
se-report/469/ (“The Administration has not provided a statement of its views 
regarding H.R. 2202 as reported by the Committee on October 24, 1996. The 
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as the “Immigrant Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 
1995” omits entirely the House language on the changes of function 
and definition of IJs.212 The bill was amended in the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and reported out by Senator Orrin Hatch on 
April 10, 1996 as part of Judiciary Committee Report.213 The final 
SB 1664 - Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 
1996 included no additional reference to the duties and title of 
special inquiry officers (IJs) or their authority that became 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1229a and 1401.214 
The first time senators had a chance to review the new IJ 
authority was in the omnibus bill that emerged from the conference 
committee on September 24, 1996 and was subject to the Senate for 
a cloture vote on September 26, 1996.215 IJs accused of overreaching 
their statutory authority in ordering the use of force against 
observers can scour the legislative history of the INA and find 
nothing to suggest Congress was the least bit concerned about 
decorum during immigration hearings or disposed toward giving 
them criminal contempt powers. 
Finally, it is worth noting that on five occasions, Rep. Bill 
McCollum (R-FL) introduced a bill that would remove the 
immigration courts from the Department of Justice and establish 
them as Article I courts with criminal contempt powers on par with 
those available to federal district court judges.216 The 1996 bill had 
 
following is a statement of views received from the Attorney General regarding H.R. 
2202 as introduced on August 4, 1995.”) (last visited May 5, 2019). 
 212. Immigrant Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1995, S. 269, 104th 
Cong. (1995); S. REP. NO. 104-249, at 1 (1996) (amending bill in the Judiciary 
Committee and reporting out by Senator Orren Hatch on April 10, 1996 as part of 
Judiciary Committee Report to accompany S. 1664). This bill was first introduced by 
Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.) on behalf of Alan K. Simpson (R-Wyo.). 
 213. S. REP. NO. 104-249, at 1 (1996). 
 214. Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1996, S. 1664, 104th 
Cong. (1996). 
 215. The House Report and the Senate Conference Report of Sept. 24, 1996 are 
both silent on IJ contempt authority. H.R. REP. NO. 104-828 (1996) (Conf. Rep. 
(accompanying H.R. 2202); S.1664-Immigration Control and Financial 
Responsibility Act of 1996, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/104th-cong
ress/senate-bill/1664/related-bills (last visited May 5, 2019). 
 216. United States Immigration Court Act of 1996, H.R. 4258, 104th Cong. (1996) 
(proposing that immigration courts have the following powers: “(c) Contempt of 
Court.—Each division of the Immigration Court shall have the power to punish by 
fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none 
other, as—(1) misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to 
obstruct the administration of justice, (2) misbehavior of any of its officers in their 
official transactions, or (3) disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, 
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no co-sponsors, and saw no committee action even after being 
referred from the House Committee on the Judiciary to the 
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims.217 Rep. McCollum 
introduced similar measures in two Congresses before the 1996 bill 
and two after it.218 None of the five proposed bills were even 
reviewed by a committee.219 
V. Statutory and Case Law on Federal Circuit Court 
(Contempt) Powers 
Unfortunately, much of the true history about criminal 
contempt was until recently buried. Wholly unfounded 
assumptions about “immemorial usage” acquired a factitious 
authority and were made the basis of legal decisions. This false 
history still enjoys wide legal currency. –Felix Frankfurter220 
In recent years, scholarly literature has taken issue with  the 
propensity of judges to depart from preferred canons of statutory 
 
order, rule, decree, or command. Each such division shall have such assistance in the 
carrying out of its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command as is available 
to a court of the United States.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
 217. H.R. 4258; H.R.4258-United States Immigration Court Act of 1996, 
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/104th-congress/house-bill/4258/all-ac
tions?actionsSearchResultViewType=expanded&_=1552262881677. 
 218. Actions for H.R. 2356-United States Immigration Court Act of 1983, CONGRE
SS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/98th-congress/house-bill/2356/actions (last 
visited May 5, 2019); Actions for H.R. 3187-United States Immigration Court Act of 
1985, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/99th-congress/house-bill/3187/a
ll-actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22actionCode%3A%5C%2272000%5C%2
2%22%5D%7D (last visited May 5, 2019); Actions for H.R. 4107-United States 
Immigration Court Act of 1998, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th-
congress/house-bill/4107/actions (last visited May 5, 2019); Actions for H.R. 185-
United States Immigration Court Act of 1999, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress
.gov/bill/106th-congress/house-bill/185/actions (last visited May 5, 2019). 
 219. The two resolutions introduced in the 1980s had co-sponsors, unlike the three 
resolutions McCollum introduced between 1996 and 1999. Actions for H.R.2356 - 
United States Immigration Court Act of 1983, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress
.gov/bill/98th-congress/house-bill/2356/actions; Actions for H.R.3187 - United States 
Immigration Court Act of 1985, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/99th-
congress/house-bill/3187/all-actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22actionCode
%3A%5C%2272000%5C%22%22%5D%7D; Actions for H.R.4107–United States 
Immigration Court Act of 1998, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th
-congress/house-bill/4107/actions; Actions for H.R. 185-United States Immigration 
Court Act of 1999, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/ho
use-bill/185/actions (last visited May 5, 2019). 
 220. Felix Frankfurter, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts 
in “Inferior” Federal Courts—A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 
1010, 1011 (1924) (revealing how the case law inflating inherent judicial authority 
had been distorted by a government brief mischaracterizing the 1809 Pennsylvania 
and 1831 U.S. judicial contempt acts). 
354 Law & Inequality [Vol. 37: 2 
 
construction to decide questions of judicial immunity especially in 
cases involving the press or observers.221 The question is whether 
the standard of quasi-immunity used for evaluating liability for 
other federal employees charged with violating Constitutional 
rights or committing torts should be used for third parties in judicial 
or judicial-like hearings.222 Deciding on liability in the context of 
third parties effectively hangs on the scope of a judge’s contempt 
powers. Are today’s powers a legacy of common law’s putative 
‘inherent’ powers?223 Or, as the Congressional record and several 
Court opinions hold, are U.S. judges constrained in their authority 
by the legislature?224 Even if officials are afforded absolute judicial 
immunity for judicial functions per Butz, these immunities cannot 
exceed the scope set for federal judges deciding these cases. If the 
federal courts are constrained by statutes, then those statutes must 
guide the interpretation of the powers of the federal courts and 
administrative hearings. The Court followed this practice in Butz 
through its careful reading of the APA and in Nye through its 
interpretation of statutory constraints on judicial contempt 
authority.225 
A. Remedies for Federal Officials’ Constitutional Rights 
Violations 
In Butz, the Court rejected the government’s defense that 
officials have absolute immunity when performing a function 
authorized by a statute.226 The Court explained 
 
 221. See Johns, supra note 38 (denouncing the expansion of judicial immunity to 
non-judges); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 38, at 1224 (arguing that sovereign 
immunity is inconsistent with requirements of the Constitution and concluding: “I 
believe that someday the Supreme Court will change course and abolish the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity from American law.”). 
 222. Chemerinsky, supra note 38, at 1221, 1222 (“Even when a cause of action 
exists, whether under Bivens or Section 1983, some officers have absolute immunity 
to suits for money damages, such as judges, prosecutors, and legislators.” For quasi-
immunity, “[t]he Supreme Court has held that government officials can be held liable 
only if they violate a clearly established right that a reasonable officer should know.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 223. Teresa S. Hanger, The Modern Status of the Rules Permitting a Judge to 
Punish Direct Contempt Summarily, 28 WM. & MARY 553, 555 (1987) (noting that 
federal courts have traced contempt power to the inherent powers of courts). 
 224. Id. (noting that federal courts have also found the contempt power stemming 
from acts of Congress). 
 225. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514–15 (1978); Nye v. United States, 313 
U.S. 33, 50–53 (1941). 
 226. Butz, 438 U.S. at 490–91. 
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[A] federal official was protected for action tortious under state 
law only if his acts were authorized by controlling federal law. 
“To make out his defense he must show that his authority was 
sufficient in law to protect him.” Since an unconstitutional act, 
even if authorized by statute, was viewed as not authorized in 
contemplation of law, there could be no immunity defense.227 
Based on this analysis, the Court affirmed absolute judicial 
immunity from suit by an aggrieved party for administrative law 
judges acting in a judicial capacity.228  
The Court focused on how the “right to compensation” could be 
best reconciled with the “need to protect the decision-making 
processes of an executive department.”229 Citing Marbury v. 
Madison,230 the Court held that “federal officials who seek absolute 
exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must 
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption 
of that scope.”231 “[I]t is not unfair to hold liable the official who 
knows or should know he is acting outside the law . . . .”232 The 
Court has subsequently held that “if equitable remedies prove 
insufficient, a damages remedy might be necessary to redress past 
harm and deter future violations. Yet the decision to recognize a 
damages remedy requires an assessment of its impact on 
 
 227. Id. (citing Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 452 
(1883); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 19 (1896); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 
218–23 (1882); Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269, 285–92 (1885)). 
 228. Butz, 438 U.S. at 515–16. Although the Court has imposed limits on Bivens 
claims, it has left in place, albeit in an ad hoc fashion, the fundamental principle of 
a remedy for a Constitutional harm. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) 
(noting that the Court has “consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new context 
or new category of defendants.”). The rationale for restricting Bivens cases to three 
exact contexts from Bivens—“a man in his own home without a warrant; a claim 
against a Congressman for firing his female secretary; and a claim against prison 
officials for failure to treat an inmate’s asthma,” Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1860 (citations 
omitted)—is as sensible as declaring that henceforth the Court will confine its 
authority over legislation to only laws that affect the appointment of federal court 
judges (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)). Ziglar was decided 4-2, with 
Gorsuch, Kagan, and Sotomayor abstaining. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1843. Breyer’s 
dissent, joined by Ginsberg, quotes extensively from Marbury. Id. at 1874 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting).  
 229. Butz, 438 U.S. at 503. See also id. at 494 (“If any inference is to be drawn 
from Spalding in any of these respects, it is that the official would not be excused 
from liability if he failed to observe obvious statutory or constitutional limitations on 
his powers or if his conduct was a manifestly erroneous application of the statute.”). 
 230. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 231. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978). 
 232. Id. 
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governmental operations systemwide.”233 In balancing these 
interests, the Court in Ziglar emphasized deference to legislative 
intent.234 Courts should not pursue judicial remedies if there are 
“sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or 
necessity of a damages remedy” or an “alternative remedial 
structure” is available.235 In addition, for cases other than those 
with the specific fact-patterns of Bivens, Davis,236 or Carlson,237 the 
four judges in the Ziglar majority stated that “special factors” had 
to be considered, i.e., whether the damages claim was for the 
purpose of deterring future unlawful actions by a specific official, as 
opposed to “‘altering an entity’s policy.”238 The framework clearly 
calls for judicial review, absent which there is no independent entity 
for evaluating these equities.239 
Leaving aside the dubious analysis of the four-justice majority 
opinion,240 none of these factors in Ziglar entail a prima facie denial 
of a constitutional claim alleging unlawful force by an IJ to silence 
a critic in violation of the First Amendment. The only remedy 
available is an administrative complaint to the same agency and 
possibly the same supervisors coordinating with the IJ to obstruct 
access (unlike ALJs, who operate independent of the agency).241 
Finally, neither Ziglar nor other precedent specifies what counts as 
litigation that is so onerous that it deters a remedy. If there is a 
balancing test that precludes a policy outcome, then the Court must 
require some showing of the specific burdens of litigation in such a 
case, possibly producing criteria for deciding this and inferring 
whether the burdens outweigh the need for a remedy. If judicial 
contempt authority for any given power is statutory and not 
‘inherent,’ then contempt orders and related actions are subject to 
 
 233. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1858. 
 234. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858 (2017). 
 235. Id. 
 236. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
 237. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 238. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1850, 1860 (citing Correctional Services Corp. v. 
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74). 
 239. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1850, 1860. Ziglar also noted factors weighing against 
remedies: Congress’s failure to provide a remedy despite publicly known allegations 
of frequent civil liberties violations, concerns about national security, and the 
alternative in some cases of a habeas remedy, id. at 1861–63, none of which are 
relevant to an immunity defense against an individual IJ’s conduct beyond the scope 
authorized by Congress and the Constitution. 
 240. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872–85 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 241. See infra Part VI. 
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judicial review and remediation. Insofar as case law disfavors 
decisions based on common law when a statute provides clear 
guidance, courts may not bestow powers exceeding limits imposed 
by Congress. 
It is important to note that the Butz Court went to some 
lengths to support the principle of Bivens actions and to distinguish 
a hearing without the due process protections of the APA from a 
lawsuit against an administrative law judge (by definition covered 
by the APA).242 Referencing the very case that prompted Congress 
to explicitly remove immigration courts from the jurisdiction of the 
APA, the Butz opinion held that “the safeguards” of the APA meant 
“the risk of an unconstitutional act by one presiding at an agency 
hearing is clearly outweighed by the importance of preserving the 
independent judgment of these men and women.”243 Each and every 
aspect of the APA the Butz opinion cited as evidence of due process 
protections is absent for immigration hearings in general and 
observers in particular. 
Professor Kent Barnett notes that administrative judges “are 
even better candidates than state supreme courts for federal 
judicial scrutiny because of AJs’ lack of comparative transparency, 
salience, federalism complications, and factual variations 
surrounding their systemic protections.”244 The evidence that IJs 
and agency supervisors are acting under the direction of the 
Attorney General to circumvent the First Amendment makes their 
discretion to order force against critics especially concerning.245 
 
 242. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500, 514 (1978) (“We agree with the 
perception of these courts that, in the absence of congressional direction to the 
contrary, there is no basis for according to federal officials a higher degree of 
immunity from liability when sued for a constitutional infringement as authorized 
by Bivens than is accorded state officials when sued for the identical violation under 
§ 1983.  The constitutional injuries made actionable by a § 1983 are of no greater 
magnitude than those for which federal officials may be responsible.”). 
 243. Id. at 514 at 514 (“”More importantly, the process of agency adjudication is 
currently structured tso as to assure that the hearing examiner exercises his 
independent judgment on the evidence before him, free from pressures by the parties 
or other officials within the agency… Since the securing of fair and competent 
hearing personnel was viewed as ‘the heart of formal administrative adjudication, 
the Administrative Procedure Act contains a number of provisions designed to 
guarantee the independence of hearing examiners … [Hearing examiners] may be 
removed only for good cause established and determined by the Civil Service 
Commission after a hearing ont eh record. Their pay is also controlled by the Civil 
Service Commission.”). 
 244. Barnett, supra note 188, at 1648. 
 245. See infra Part VI. 
358 Law & Inequality [Vol. 37: 2 
 
B. Federal Court Contempt Authority 
The Act of 1831 introduced the text for the modern statutory 
language providing federal judges the power of summary 
contempt.246 It was introduced the day after a judge who targeted a 
newspaper editor prevailed in an impeachment proceeding and 
affirms Congress’s effort to control the contempt powers of lower 
courts.247 In the Act, Congress expressly narrowed the scope of 
summary contempt power after hearings provided a consensus that 
the federal district courts and their powers were creatures of 
Congress, a point with which the Court agrees.248 
Each time Congress and the Court have revisited the contempt 
powers of federal courts, the record once again contains a statement 
about the prerogative of the legislature and the overstatement of 
judicial contempt powers in the immediate context, and indicates 
that lower courts mistakenly had inferred expanded contempt 
powers from a murky past.249 The record shows Congress and the 
 
 246. An Act Declaratory of the Law Concerning Contempts of Court, ch. 103, 4 
Stat. 487–488 (Mar. 2, 1831). 
 247. Frankfurter, supra note 220, at 1025–26. 
 248. Frankfurter, supra note 220, at 1010, 1025–28. See Act of March 3, 1911, 
Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 1087 (1911); see also Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 
Pub. L. No. 80-772, ch. 645 (June 25, 1948) (explaining the legislative history of the 
title’s enactment). 
 249. See Frankfurter, supra note 220 and accompanying text. See also Charles P. 
Curtis & Richard C. Curtis, The Story of a Notion in the Law of Criminal Contempt, 
41 HARV. L. REV. 51, 56–57 (1927). Summary contempt power was not part of 
common law, although English courts in the eighteenth century wrongfully asserted 
otherwise. “However erroneous [Wilmot and Blackstone] were in their assertion that 
the jurisdiction was of common law origin, yet their statements of the [summary 
contempt] doctrine which we are examining are complete and accurate. Thus did our 
notion become firmly established in the courts of common law. Obviously it could not 
remain intact.” Id.; Defining and Limiting the Jurisdiction of Courts Sitting in 
Equity: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary H. of Reps. on H.R. 5315, 77th 
Cong. 8–9 (1932) (statement of Donald Richberg, representing the Railway Labor 
Executives Association: “Mr. Warren had made an extensive investigation into the 
circumstances surrounding the passage of the first judicial act, practically by the 
same men who framed the Constitution of the United States. He had had access to 
documents that had been reposing in just for years, I believe some in the attic and 
some in the cellar of the Capitol. As a result, he had published in the Harvard Law 
Review in 1923 the results of that research, which showed beyond any possibility of 
contradiction on a historical basis that the men who framed the Constitution and the 
men who wrote the first judicial act understood that the inferior Federal courts were 
entirely subject to the control of Congress, so far as investing them with jurisdiction 
and determining their procedure is concerned.” Stating just previously, “And yet the 
argument was made and had been made in the Supreme Court of the United States 
for 100 years that it was the inherent power of a court of equity to try contempt cases 
by the court, and that when the court was created by the Federal Government that 
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Court attempting to limit judicial prerogative of summary contempt 
and tie it to a limited policy purpose.250 Caselaw offers no instances 
in which the Court has recognized a contempt power for an inferior 
federal court exceeding the jurisdiction and scope provided for by 
Congress. 
i. Congressional Hearings and Court Precedent, 1911–1941 
The statute that today provides the scope of contempt powers 
to federal judges was passed in 1831 and affirmed in 1911.251 A 
statement by Chair Henry Clayton (D-AL) of the 1911 House 
Committee summarizes both his own understanding of the 
prerogative of Congress to define the jurisdiction and scope of 
contempt authority as well as the Supreme Court’s imprimatur on 
his interpretation: 
The moment the courts of the United States were called into 
existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject they 
became possessed of this [contempt] power . . . but the power 
has been limited and defined by the act of Congress of March 3, 
1831 . . . The act, in terms, applies to all courts. Whether it can 
be held to limit the authority of the Supreme Court, which 
derives its existence and power from the Constitution, may, 
perhaps, be a matter of doubt; but that it applies to the circuit 
and district courts there can be no question. These courts were 
created by act of Congress. Their powers and duties depend 
upon the act calling them into existence, or subsequent acts 
extending or limiting their jurisdiction. The act of 1831 is, 
therefore, to them the law specifying the cases in which 
summary punishment for contempts may be inflicted.252 
 
power was poured into the court. It was absolutely untrue historically, and it was 
untrue as a fact, and of the intention of the framers of the Constitution who passed 
the first judicial act.”). 
 250. See infra Part V.B.ii. 
 251. See supra Part V (discussing the initial enactment of the 1831 statute and 
history of the 1911 enactment). 
 252. Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Reps. on 
Contempt of Court, 62nd Cong., 37 & 44–45 (1911) (statement by Chairman Henry 
Clayton (quoting Bessette v. W. B. Conkoy Co., 194 U.S. 324, 327 (1904); Ex parte 
Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873))). 
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The analysis offered in the 1911 hearing by Representative 
Wilson253 and Jackson H. Ralston254 carries forward the rule of law 
envisioned by Edward Coke, John Locke, and Thomas Jefferson, 
and provides further guidance as to the prerogative of Congress to 
control the contempt powers of all courts save the Supreme Court.255 
The following exchange during the 1911 hearing also 
underscores the view that Congress creates courts and its contempt 
powers: 
MR. THOMAS [D-KY]. Has a United States circuit court any such 
thing as an inherent power? 
MR. RALSTON. I am not prepared on all questions of 
constitutional law to-day [sic]; but I should think it had no 
power except such as was conferred upon it. 
MR. THOMAS. Is not all the power of these courts conferred upon 
them by act of Congress? 
MR. RALSTON. That is correct. 
. . . 
 
 253. Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Reps. on 
Contempt of Court, 62nd Cong., 56 (Statement by Hon. William B. Wilson (R-Penn.)) 
(“The only powers which our courts have are the powers which are granted to them 
by the Constitution and by our laws, and that all other powers exercised by our courts 
are usurpations of authority. I can realize that where the court believes that such 
powers are implied in order to carry out the powers that are specifically granted will 
exercise its discretion in the use of those implied powers where there is no law to the 
contrary. But when the question arises in the legislative branch of the Government 
as to how far those implied powers can be carried by the courts of our country, then 
the legislative branch of the Government has, or at least should have, the power to 
determine whether or not the construction of the court relative to its implied powers 
is correct or incorrect and to define the limitations of those implied powers.”). 
 254. Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Reps. on 
Contempt of Court, 62nd Cong., at 38–39, 60 (statement of Jackson H. Ralston) 
(“Theoretically a contempt is a disobedience of a certain impalpable thing, something 
we may not put our hands upon, the law. But in point of fact it is a violation of the 
commands of a human being, although clothed in form of law; and it is very, very 
difficult for that human being to try a case of contempt without the personal feeling 
entering into it, and the difficulty is not removed when the question is sent to one of 
his associates, who is very likely, in a greater or less degree, to share either the 
individual feeling of the judge whose orders have been violated, or the general feeling 
of the bench that whatever proceeds from the blench is sanctified itself. So that the 
work of the jury in breaking the force of those feelings is one of the very greatest 
possible importance, and of the greatest possible public advantage.”). Ralston 
successfully represented labor activist Samuel Gompers in Gompers v. Buck’s Stove 
& Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) and Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914), 
cases involving the scope of judicial contempt authority in. J.H. Ralston Dead; Noted 
Lawyer, 88, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 1945), https://www.nytimes.com/1945/10/14/archiv
es/jhralston-dead-noted-lawyer-88-an-authority-on-international-cases.html. 
 255. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 566 (1906) (“An act of Congress controls 
the courts of its own creation, but not this court . . . .”). 
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MR. MOON [R-PA.]. It has inherent judicial power that no power 
can take away. 
MR. THOMAS. I contend that these courts have no power of any 
character, inherent, or otherwise, except what is conferred upon 
them by the act of Congress creating them. What do you think 
about that? 
RALSTON. I think that is true, except as to the Supreme Court 
of the United States.256 
Although Moon was asked about the inherent powers of courts, 
he recognized that contempt orders had to be made for contempt 
power to be effected:  
Mr. MOON: Is it not true that the rule of law is that a contempt 
order must have been one that was judicially and properly 
made?  
MR. DAVENPORT: Certainly; so far as it is jurisdictional.  
Mr. MOON: And one which the court had a right to make.257  
Shortly before this, on March 3, 1911, Congress passed “[a]n 
Act [t]o codify, revise, and amend the laws relating to the 
judiciary.”258 The law clarified Congress’s perception of its role in 
defining contempt powers. There was one express exception, the 
now-defunct Court of Claims, which “may punish for contempt in 
the manner prescribed by the common law, may appoint 
commissioners, and may exercise such powers as are necessary to 
carry into effect the powers granted to it by law.”259 That Congress 
in the same bill created one set of contempt guidelines for the Court 
of Claims and another for other federal courts leaves no doubt about 
its intentions. 
 
 256. Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Reps. on 
Contempt of Court, supra note 252, at 39–40. 
 257. Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Reps. on 
Contempt of Court, supra note 252, at 30. 
 258. Act of March 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 1087 (1911). 
 259. Act of March 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 1139 (detailing contempt 
powers of the Court of Claims); Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 274–75 (1889) (quoting 
Act of Congress of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99 § 725) (“The said courts shall have power to 
impose and administer all necessary oaths, and to punish, by fine or imprisonment, 
at the discretion of the court, contempts of their authority: provided, that such power 
to punish contempts shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the 
misbehavior of any person in their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the 
administration of justice, the misbehavior of any of the officers of said courts in their 
official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any such officer, or by any 
party, juror, witness, or other person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, 
or command of the said courts.”). 
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Congress revisited the question of contempt powers specific to 
injunctive orders over twenty years later:260 
The judiciary act of September 24, 1789, passed by the First 
Congress, creating the United States district courts as the first 
inferior Federal courts, not only created the courts but 
expressly conferred jurisdiction; and in conferring jurisdiction 
it said: ‘The said courts shall have power to impose and 
administer all necessary oaths, and to punish, by fine or 
imprisonment at the discretion of the court, contempts of their 
authority.’ Maybe it was inherent, but it was expressly granted 
also by the judiciary act. As early as 1831, more than a hundred 
years ago, the Congress found it necessary to limit that power, 
and, by the act of March 2, 1831, Congress enacted into law this 
provision.261 
In 1924, the Court in Michaelson v. U.S. ex rel. Chicago, St. P., 
M. & O. Ry. Co. affirmed this line of analysis and jettisoned any 
“inherent judicial powers” of lower district courts in conflict with 
Congressional statutes on contempt powers: 
The courts of the United States when called into existence and 
vested with jurisdiction over any subject, at once become 
possessed of the power. So far as the inferior Federal courts are 
concerned, however, it is not beyond the authority of Congress; 
but the attributes which inhere in that power and are 
inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor rendered 
practically inoperative. That it may be regulated within limits 
not precisely defined may not be doubted.262 
In the wake of this hearing, Congress passed the Norris-
LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act requiring a trial by jury for any 
contempt charge outside the immediate presence of the court if 
based on an injunctive order tied to labor organizing.263 It further 
allowed the defendant in such a proceeding to “file with the court a 
demand for the retirement of the judge sitting in the proceeding, if 
the contempt arises from an attack upon the character or conduct 
of such judge and if the attack occurred elsewhere than in the 
 
 260. Defining and Limiting the Jurisdiction of Courts Sitting in Equity: Hearing 
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary H. of Reps. on H.R. 5315, 77th Cong. 90 (1932). 
 261. Defining and Limiting the Jurisdiction of Courts Sitting in Equity: Hearing 
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary H. of Reps. on H.R. 5315, 77th Cong. 54 (1932) 
(Statement by James S. Easby-Smith, counsel for American Federation of Labor). 
 262. 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924) (internal citations omitted). 
 263. Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act, Pub. L. No. 72-65, ch. 90, § 11, 47 
Stat. 70 (1932). 
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presence of the court or so near thereto as to interfere directly with 
the administration of justice.”264 
ii. Modern Jurisprudence on Court Contempt Authority 
There is something unseemly at best in a judge sua sponte or 
otherwise invoking alleged pre-constitutional common law 
intuitions that conflict with more recent case law and favor those 
wearing “black nightgowns” themselves.265 The cases discussed by 
other scholars who argue judges should limit their grants of 
immunity to government officials all refer to actions that were part 
of their jurisdiction or were not excluded from it by Congress.266 At 
stake is whether it is correct to exclude complaints for bad faith or 
unconstitutional conduct by officials acting in a putatively judicial 
capacity from judicial review. The three main criticisms of 
prevailing precedent are that it has: 1) expanded absolute judicial 
immunity to non-judicial state employees; 2) expanded absolute 
judicial immunity to functions that are not inherently judicial; and 
3) created a self-serving exclusion from standards citizens 
otherwise are afforded for due process and the rule of law under the 
U.S. Constitution. 
The case against absolute immunity for IJs who order force 
avoids these thickets. Not only does the statute deprive IJs of 
summary contempt powers,267 case law indicates Congress’s has the 
authority to limit even the inherent judicial powers of federal 
district court. There are two questions at the heart of the issue. May 
those acting in an official quasi-judicial capacity exert summary 
contempt-like powers afforded judges under common law that 
Congress has deprived them of? And if so, are such actions to be 
afforded absolute judicial immunity or only quasi-immunity? 
a. The Powers of Federal Courts Derive from Congress and 
Are Not Inherent 
A line of decisions indicate that the powers of federal courts, 
including summary contempt authority, come from Congress and 
 
 264. Pub. L. No. 72-65, ch. 90, § 12. The act has not been repealed. 
 265. See Hanger, supra note 223, at 561 (criticizing the latitude the Court afforded 
the statutory reach of summary contempt powers). 
 266. See, e.g., Johns, supra note 38, at 276–310 (discussing the expansion of 
judicial immunity to non-judges in the judicial system). 
 267. See Hanger, supra note 223 (discussing the narrowing of summary contempt 
powers). 
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are not inherent. In Nye v. United States,268 the Court vacated and 
remanded for trial a contempt conviction for pressuring an illiterate 
plaintiff “feeble in mind and body” to dismiss a lawsuit.269 Both the 
majority and the dissent found that the Court was “dealing here 
only with a problem of statutory construction, not with a question 
as to the constitutionally permissible scope of the contempt 
power.”270 The Court noted that “[w]e cannot by the process of 
interpretation obliterate the distinctions which Congress drew” 
between contempt in and out of the presence of the judge.271 It 
explained that the “legislative history of th[e] statute and its career 
demonstrate that this case presents the question of correcting a 
plain misreading of language and history so as to give full respect 
to the meaning which Congress unmistakably intended the statute 
to have.”272 In dissent, Justice Stone also affirmed that the statute 
had “curtailed an authority which federal courts exercised before its 
enactment[,]”273 a restriction that could not exist if contempt powers 
of the lower courts were inherent and could not be restrained by the 
legislature. 
Teresa Hanger points out that while state courts were 
referencing the inherent powers of courts on an ad hoc basis, 
“federal courts . . . have found that the contempt power stems from 
acts of Congress. In fact, the Supreme Court now adheres to the 
latter view.”274 Subsequent cases demonstrate the Court’s 
inclination to review and overturn summary contempt orders under 
circumstances exceeding the statutory authority—such as an IJ 
irritated by observers. In In re Oliver,275 the Court overturned a 
summary contempt conviction because the alleged contemnor’s 
conduct of lying, although in the presence of the judge, did not 
 
 268. 313 U.S. 33 (1941). 
 269. Id. at 39 (“Petitioners, through the use of liquor and persuasion, induced 
Elmore to seek a termination of the action.”). 
 270. Id. at 50. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 51. 
 273. Id. at 53. 
 274. Hanger, supra note 223, at 555. 
 275. 333 U.S. 257, 276–78 (1948). While the Contemnor was found guilty in the 
state court under a state statute providing state judges summary contempt powers, 
the “failure to afford the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to defend himself 
against the charge of false and evasive swearing was a denial of due process of law.” 
Id. at 273. 
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physically obstruct court proceedings. In Sacher v. United States,276 
the Court held that the summary contempt power to remove 
someone from a court room was rooted in a statute and a federal 
rule of civil procedure designed to specify its implementation. It also 
recognized Congress’s and its own restraints on any so-called 
“inherent” judicial powers.277 In Offutt v. United States,278 the Court 
found that personal animosity between the attorney and the judge 
issuing the contempt order was sufficient grounds to reverse the 
order.279 In Bloom v. Illinois,280 the Court overturned a summary 
contempt conviction, finding that any conviction for a “serious 
contempt” violated the Sixth Amendment.281 “Genuine respect, 
which alone can lend true dignity to our judicial establishment, will 
be engendered, not by the fear of unlimited authority [of a judge], 
but by the firm administration of the law through those 
institutionalized procedures which have been worked out over the 
centuries.”282 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit in 1987 overturned a 
contempt order the panel found no evidence of an “actual 
obstruction of justice” by the alleged contemnor.283 
The harm posed to the public by an IJ untethered to the rule 
of law may be far more consequential to individuals and policy than 
summary contempt convictions. The need for an appeal process in 
the wake of a formal punishment of a third party by a judge is no 
different than the need for an appeal for a third party deterred from 
observing hearings. This is particularly true in cases of unlawful 
 
 276. 343 U.S. 1, 11 (1952); id. at 7 (“Rule 42 obviously was intended to make more 
explicit ‘the prevailing usages at law’ by which the statute has authorized 
punishment of contempts.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 277. Id. at 25 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[a]nd even before Congress drew on 
its power to put limits on inherent judicial authority, this Court derived the general 
boundaries of this power from its purpose . . . .”). 
 278. 348 U.S. 11 (1954). 
 279. Id. at 17 (“The record is persuasive that instead of representing the 
impersonal authority of law, the trial judge permitted himself to become personally 
embroiled with the petitioner.”). 
 280. 391 U.S. 194 (1968). 
 281. Id. at 209 (“When a serious contempt is at issue, considerations of efficiency 
must give way to the more fundamental interest of ensuring the evenhanded exercise 
of judicial power.”). 
 282. Id. at 208. 
 283. United States v. Turner, 812 F.2d 1552, 1568 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing In re 
McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 234 (1962)). 
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force for which no official order is on the record and indeed was 
ordered secretly and then hidden.284 
b. Statutory Powers of Administrative Judges  
As noted in Part II, one hurdle confronting courts reviewing 
challenges to administrative judges’ orders is the apparent 
similarity between the terminology, costumes, and interior design 
of administrative and Article III court hearings.285 Professor Kent 
Barnett notes the obscurity of attorneys employed within agencies 
as “administrative judges” (AJ), and how courts and others confuse 
them with “administrative law judges,” although the AJs lack the 
expertise, professionalism, and independence of the latter.286 
That said, AJs do need order to conduct their hearings. But no 
rationale supports a need for more order and more tools than other 
federal officials. Federal officials conduct business in an orderly 
fashion despite disgruntled and even unruly citizens with the 
assistance of security guards, who are often hired through the 
Federal Protective Service.287 Bona fide disruptions or threats are 
the responsibility of security personnel, who have the legal 
 
 284. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 96, at 10–11 (illustrating how Judge 
Cassidy hid his orders to remove appellant). The rationale for immunities under Butz  
is to avoid endless litigation by a party unhappy with a hearing order.  438 U.S. 478, 
512 (1978) (“The loser in one forum will frequently seek another, charging the 
participants in the first with unconstitutional animus.  Absolute immunity is thus 
necessary to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their 
respective functions without harassment or intimidation.”)  The same rationale does 
not apply to a third party observer to the hearings.  The disputants contemplated by 
Butz had recourse to a proceeding with safeguards of independence, unlike a hearing 
observer as contemplated by the Eleventh Circuit panel decision in Stevens. Stevens 
v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2017) (Williams, J., concurring) (“These 
facts animate the claim that the process available to Professor Stevens was not just 
‘displeasing’ but arguably inadequate as a check on IJ Cassidy’s misconduct.”). 
 285. Supra Part II. 
 286. Barnett, supra note 188, at 1660–61 (“Indeed, the Bush administration came 
under fire for appointing Immigration Judges (“IJs”)—a category of AJs—based on 
political criteria, instead of under a competitive process. Half of the 37 hired IJs had 
no immigration experience, and those with experience had all worked in enforcement 
or as prosecutor.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 287. The Federal Protective Service is a component of the Department of 
Homeland Security with the “mission to protect federal buildings, federal employees 
and contractors, and visitors to federal facilities.” Federal Protective Service 
Operations, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/fps-operations (last 
updated June 29, 2016). 
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authority to evaluate risk to public order and charge people with 
disorderly conduct.288 
EOIR stated that even its top officials cannot order guards 
employed by ICE to allow observers into immigration hearings, 
regardless of the regulation mandating public access.289 The 
Eleventh Circuit did not address the merits of this interpretation of 
functional responsibilities. It relied instead on a superficial 
resemblance between immigration hearings and Article III courts, 
and provided no substantive legal reason IJs should have unilateral 
authority not available to other federal employees conducting public 
business.290 Indeed, many of the hearings at issue have been for 
those detained, which occur by televideo in an otherwise empty 
room.291 That these hearings may as well occur in an office as a 
courtroom suggests they are administrative rather than true court 
proceedings. Absent the presence of attorneys, court reporters, and 
staff, the immigration hearing room may offer no real-time 
accountability to other witnesses of IJ orders to use force. In other 
words, the use of force against an observer likely happens most 
often in secret. 
Constitutional problems with closed hearings aside,292 IJs 
have authority only to close hearings under 8 CFR 1003.27. The 
regulation does not, however, give IJs more command authority 
over guards than clerks working in adjacent offices. First, as was 
the case for observer Bonnie Pechter, an IJ can order a hearing 
closed and then postpone the hearing until after the order has been 
reviewed by a federal court without having to order a guard to clear 
it.293 Similar authority for judicial review of orders to close hearings 
occurred in response to demands for declaratory and injunctive 
relief in Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media.294 
 
 288. 40 U.S.C. § 1315 (2008). 
 289. Brief for Appellant, Stevens v. Lynch, No. 16-12007-DD, 2016 WL 3964938, 
at *21 (11th Cir. Jul. 20, 2016). 
 290. See Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1301–04 (11th Cir. 2017) (discussing 
the similarities of IJs and Article III judges). 
 291. Jacqueline Stevens, Lawless Courts, NATION (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.the
nation.com/article/155497/lawless-courts (reporting televideo hearing conducted by 
immigration judge in violation of agency protocols). 
 292. See Kitrosser, supra note 79 (supporting the public’s First Amendment right 
to observe immigration hearings). 
 293. Pechter v. Lyons, 441 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
 294. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d. 948 (E.D. Mich. 2002); N. 
Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d. 198 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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Hearing closures are supposed to be predicated on the 
characteristics of the hearing, not the identity of the observers 
present on any given day.295 These decisions can and should be 
made in advance of the hearing itself. Government requests to close 
hearings are supposed to take the form of a motion in writing.296 If 
an IJ or a party has followed this protocol and insists on proceeding 
immediately with a closed hearing without allowing time for 
judicial review, an IJ can exclude the public without using force 
simply by locking the courtroom doors.297 An exclusion imposed 
without an opportunity for review arguably would trigger a 
constitutional remedy, including one authorized under Bivens.298 
3. Stevens Revisited 
In Stevens, the Eleventh Circuit stated that IJs are 
functionally equivalent to judges, and therefore have the authority 
to remove people from federal buildings housing immigration 
hearing rooms.299 In noting the similarities between federal courts 
and judges, on the one hand, and immigration hearings and IJs, on 
the other, the panel quoted 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A), (B), with the 
glaring exception of the sentence limiting IJ contempt powers to 
civil fines.300 The panel’s analysis puts forward a common law 
defense of IJ contempt powers without any engagement with the 
case law disfavoring this approach.301 
If Congress imposes statutory limits on the summary 
contempt powers of administrative judges, may courts supersede 
those limits based on common law? And, if they may not—an 
interpretation in keeping with prevailing precedent on statutory 
 
 295. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27. 
 296. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46. 
 297. Observers are regularly excluded from hearings by staff locking the doors to 
hearing rooms. In July 2014, Stevens was observing the hearings of IJ Clarease 
Rakin Yates in Houston. Following an announced break, Stevens was unable to re-
enter the locked room. An administrator informed Stevens that Rakin Yates had 
ordered this in private. 
 298. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding the 
existence of a constitutional remedy by waiver of immunity for law enforcement due 
to illegal acts). 
 299. Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1305–07 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 300. Id. at 1303. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) for language limiting contempt powers 
to civil money penalty. 
 301. See EIG, supra note 202 (interpreting comparable statutes in which Congress 
specifies different conduct). 
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construction302—on what basis may courts impute similar judicial 
functions and immunities? If the legislation proposed by Bill 
McCollum had passed, IJs would have summary contempt powers 
and arguably absolute immunity for actions taken in their official 
capacities.303 Maintaining order is necessary, but the appropriate 
extent of force and the actual motives are factual questions.304 They 
are therefore better suited to a jury.305 The Eleventh Circuit and 
other courts have expanded judicial immunities to non-judges based 
on precedent derived from common law rather than keeping pace 
with policy and legislative developments and judicial powers and 
immunities precedent.306 
VI. Immigration Judge Misconduct: Administrative 
Remedy? 
The majority in Stevens noted that a third party aggrieved by 
alleged IJ misconduct had an administrative remedy.307 In her 
dissent, Judge Williams questioned that assumption because the 
very officials responsible for investigating the complaint had also 
been embarrassed by Stevens’ reporting.308 This section reviews the 
internal protocols and outcomes of IJ misconduct complaint 
investigations more generally. Original quantitative and 
qualitative analyses of investigations into 768 IJ misconduct 
complaints filed between 2002 and 2016 show: (1) the complaints 
are concentrated among certain IJs; (2) there is no escalation of 
 
 302. See Hanger, supra note 223. 
 303. H.R. 4258, 104th Cong. (1995-1996). 
 304. Consider, for instance, if an IJ shot an observer and claimed, as a defense for 
civil damages, that it was his prerogative to maintain courtroom order and the 
observer in the lobby posed a threat to this. 
 305. Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d. 1293, 1313 (11th Cir. 2017) (“I disagree with the 
blanket assertion that for judicial immunity purposes, ordering persons removed 
from a courthouse is an obligation for judges and an ordinary function performed by 
judges.”); id. at 1313 n.1 (“The cases cited by the majority . . . all involve individuals 
who disturbed ongoing proceedings in the courtroom or otherwise obstructed 
adjudicatory matters before the judge. None address judicial immunity.”); id. at 
1313–14 (“Absent [a] connection to an ongoing judicial proceeding, however, the 
‘nature of the function’ performed is not necessarily judicial.”). 
 306. See, e.g., Douglas K. Barth, Immunity of Federal and State Judges from Civil 
Suit — Time for a Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 727 (1977) 
(“[The] shield of immunity not only leaves the injured victim without a remedy, but 
also allows the offending judge to remain on the bench . . . . [The author] proposes a 
partial immunity for judges limited to good-faith acts . . . .”). 
 307. Stevens, 877 F.3d. at 1308 n.13. 
 308. Id. at 1315. See also id. at 1315 n.3. 
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responses to complaints against repeat-offenders; (3) the quasi-
judicial character of the IJ position lends itself to agency cover-ups; 
and (4) the coding and tracking of complaints is slip-shod—officials 
are inclined to dismiss complaints despite internal communications 
acknowledging a facially valid complaint was stated. 
A. Immigration Judge Complaint and Investigation 
Protocols 
The current IJ misconduct review process referenced in 
Stevens emerged from then Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez’s 22 
Measures of Improvement to the Immigration Courts and Board of 
Appeals.309 This review was occasioned by Congressional hearings 
and media coverage of partisanship in the appointment of IJs and 
abysmal incidents of adjudication.310 DOJ political appointee 
Monica Goodling testified that she selected IJs with strong ties to 
the Republican Party establishment or ideology.311 Gonzalez’s 
memorandum mandated new procedures for reporting to EOIR’s 
leadership “adjudications that reflect immigration judge 
temperament problems or poor Immigration Court or Board 
quality . . . .”312 The result was to “[i]mplement a process for 
receiving, evaluating, and responding to complaints of 
inappropriate conduct by EOIR adjudicators.”313 
EOIR’s Ethics and Professionalism Guide for Immigration 
Judges314 is an internal advisory memorandum lifted virtually 
verbatim from the misconduct statutes and regulations governing 
all federal employees. It differs markedly from the Model Code of 
 
 309. Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Alberto Gonzalez, Measures to Improve the 
Immigration Courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals, DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 9, 
2006), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2009/02/10/ag-080906.pdf 
[hereinafter Gonzalez, Measures to Improve]. 
 310. Barnett, supra note 188, at 1660–61. 
 311. Monica Goodling, Remarks of Monica M. Goodling before the Committee on 
the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives 6 (May 23, 2007), https://web
.archive.org/web/20070609195922/http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/GoodlingII
070523.pdf. 
 312. Gonzalez, Measures to Improve, supra note 309, at 3. 
 313. The Attorney General’s Management Review of the Immigration Hearing 
Process, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,675 (Sept. 20, 2007) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(b)(1)(viii)). 
 314. EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM 
GUIDE FOR IMMIGRATION JUDGES (2011), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eo
ir/legacy/2013/05/23/EthicsandProfessionalismGuideforIJs.pdf. 
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Judicial Conduct315 and the U.S. Code for Judicial Conduct316 used 
for Article III state and federal judges, respectively, as well as the 
ethics code for ALJs.317 EOIR adjudicators are unionized and their 
employment relations are governed by Articles 8 and 9 of the Labor 
Agreement between the National Association of Immigration 
Judges (NAIJ) and EOIR.318 
EOIR states its recommendations will reflect the “immigration 
judge’s length of service and past disciplinary record, mitigating 
circumstances, the likelihood of repeat occurrence absent action by 
the Agency, the impact of the offense on the reputation of the 
agency, and the consistency of the penalty with similar instances of 
misconduct.”319 Instructions for filing misconduct complaints 
appear on the EOIR website.320 The supervisor investigating the 
complaints is an Assistant Chief Immigration Judge (ACIJ).321 The 
supervisor overseeing all investigations is the ACIJ of Conduct and 
Professionalism (ACIJ C/P).322 Upon receipt, an employee of the 
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ) must assign a number 
and “create an entry for it in OCIJ’s complaint tracking 
database.”323 Complaint sources may be “anonymous, respondent’s 
 
 315. A.B.A., ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2011), https://www.americ
anbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2011_mcjc_p
reamble_scope_terminology.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 316. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES 
(2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol02a-ch02_0.pdf. 
 317. The Office of Personnel Management relies on the A.B.A. Model Code for 
Judicial Conduct for ALJ disciplinary procedures. See A.B.A., supra note 315. 
 318. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, SUMMARY OF OCIJ PROCEDURE FOR 
HANDLING COMPLAINTS AGAINST IMMIGRATION JUDGES 2 n.3 (2010), https://www.ju
stice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/05/23/IJComplaintProcess.pdf 
[hereinafter EOIR, SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT PROCESS] (“If an IJ wishes to challenge 
a disciplinary action, the IJ may either file a grievance . . . or pursue applicable 
statutory remedies . . . .”). 
 319. Id. 
 320. See id. at 1. A complaint may also be communicated “orally, and it may be 
anonymous.” Id. For instructions for filing complaints and contact information, see 
Instructions for Filing a Complaint Regarding an Immigration Judge’s Conduct, 
EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/EO
IR/instructions-filing-complaint-regarding-immigration-judges-conduct (last 
updated May 5, 2015). 
 321. See EOIR, SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT PROCESS, supra note 318, at 2 (“For 
matters that fall outside of OPR or OIG jurisdiction, an ACIJ will investigate the 
complaint.”). 
 322. Id. (“Throughout the process, all complaints will be monitored by the ACIJ 
C/P to ensure proper and expeditious handling and resolution.”). 
 323. Id. at 1. The Chief Immigration Judge (CIJ) and the ACIJs are supervisors 
and have no adjudicative responsibilities. See id. at 2 (explaining that when 
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attorney, third party, (e.g., relative, an interested attorney, a 
courtroom observer, etc.), Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), 
Respondent, Circuit Court, OIL (Office of Immigration Litigation), 
EOIR, OPR, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of 
Inspector General (OIG), main justice, media, and other.”324 The 
agency codes we analyzed were: in-court conduct, incapacity, out-of-
court conduct, due process, bias, legal, criminal, and other. The 
ACIJ C/P offered frequent suggestions to the ACIJs performing the 
investigations as to how to code and respond to the complaints. We 
noted no discrepancies between the ACIJ C/P suggestions and the 
formal findings sent to the IJ from the ACIJs. In addition to 
listening to the hearing recordings, the ACIJ “may also solicit 
statements from the complainant, the IJ, and any witnesses.”325 
Possible agency responses ranged from the dismissal of the 
complaint for “failure to state a claim”—the most frequent 
response—to firing the accused IJ.326 The three-page “Complaint 
Procedure” available on the agency website provides no criteria for 
“misconduct.”327 
B. Findings 
i. Complaint Distribution 
Of the 768 complaints for which we have information, ACIJs 
coded 60% (n = 460) as “in-court conduct”; 37% (n = 284) as “due 
process” complaints; 25% (n = 194) as “legal”; 18% (n = 134) as 
“bias”; and 10% (n = 76) as “out-of-court conduct.” Just 1% (n = 8) 
referenced “criminal conduct.”328 There were 268 IJs employed 
 
disciplinary action is appropriate, the Deputy Chief Immigration Judge reviews and 
imposes the appropriate discipline). 
 324. For example, “a relative, an interested attorney, a courtroom observer, etc.), 
BIA, Respondent, Circuit Court, OIL (Office of Immigration Litigation), EOIR, OPR, 
DHS, OIG, main justice, media, and other.” Id. 
 325. Id. at 2 (“[T]he investigation will usually begin with a review of the hearing 
record, including the audio recordings.”). Audio recordings are created solely by the 
IJs and may omit exchanges at their discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.9 (2019) (“In his or 
her discretion, the immigration judge may exclude from the record any arguments 
made in connection with motions, applications, requests, or objections . . . .”). 
 326. EOIR, SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT PROCESS, supra note 318, at 3; see infra 
Section VI.B.ii.  
 327. See EOIR, SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT PROCESS, supra note 318. 
 328. Twenty-three ACIJs evaluated the complaints. ACIJ information is missing 
for case numbers 608 and 609, referencing also 22, 27, 76, and 173. We received 
anonymized data with a three letter code assigned to each IJ.  First and last name 
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during the time frame these complaints were recorded, of whom 200 
elicited at least 1 complaint.329 
A key finding is that just 7 IJs accounted for 24% of all 
complaints. Sixteen IJs (6%) accounted for 299 (39%) of the 
complaints, and 15% of the IJs (n = 41) drew 60% of the complaints. 
Nine (3.4%) had between 10 and 19 complaints. The plurality of IJs 
with reported complaints (41%, n = 109) had just 1 to 2 complaints 
each, and another 48 (18%) had 3 to 4 complaints lodged against 
them. These results are consistent with police misconduct research: 










initials in this Article are for the ACIJs, whose identities EOIR made public. At the 
high end, ACIJs LD and GS coded 113 and 100 complaints about the actions of 26 
and 33 IJs, respectively. Six ACIJs handled fewer than 10 complaints each. In 301 
cases, more than one possible type of misconduct was indicated, e.g., “due process” 
and “legal,” and thus the codes total to greater than 768. See notes on file with 
author. 
 329. See IMMIGRATION JUDGE REPORTS—ASYLUM, TRAC IMMIGRATION, https://tr
ac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judgereports (last visited Mar. 21, 2019). 
 330. See Angela Caputo & Jeremy Gorner, Small Group of Chicago Police Costs 
City Millions in Settlements, CHIC. TRIB. (Jan. 30, 2016), https://www.chicagotribun
e.com/news/ct-chicago-police-misconduct-settlements-met-20160129-story.html 
(finding that 124 police officers of about 12,000 total were identified in 1/3 of 
misconduct lawsuits). The paucity of research on misconduct also bears reflection. 
See Sandro Cabral & Sérgio G. Lazzarini, The “Guarding the Guardians” Problem: 
An Analysis of the Organizational Performance of an Internal Affairs Division, 25 J. 
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 797, 799 (2014) (describing analysis of a police oversight 
body and finding that “systematic empirical research on [Internal Affairs Divisions] 
and other watchdog agencies has been surprisingly scant.”); Linda Kleve Trevino, 
The Social Effects of Punishment in Organizations: A Justice Perspective, 17 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 647, 668 (1992) (“Despite its widespread use as a management tool, a 
relatively small amount of research has been conducted on organizational 
punishment.”). See also Brian Niehoff et al., The Social Effects of Punishment Events: 
The Influence of Violator Past Performance Record and Severity of the Punishment 
on Observers’ Justice Perceptions and Attitudes, 19 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 589, 
601 (1998) (describing their study on the social effects of punishment and concluding 
that “[t]here is still much research to do before we can understand the social effects 
of punishment completely.”). 
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Table I: Distribution of Complaints Across Immigration Judges 
 
IJ Category Complaints 
per IJ 
# IJs Complaints 
(% of total) 
# IJs 
Suspended 
# IJs Retired 
or Terminated 
Extreme 20+ 7 24% 2 1 
High 10-19 9 15% 1 1 
Medium 5-9 25 21% 6 1 
Low 3-4 48 21% 0 4 
Negligible 1-2 109 19% 0 6 
None 0 70 0% 0 0 
 
To test whether the variation in complaints tracked the 
variation in caseloads, we reviewed the caseloads for 30 anonymized 
IJs using EOIR’s code sheet, as well as the asylum proceeding 
caseloads for IJs deanonymized.331 We found that IJ caseloads were 
not causing the variation in IJ misconduct complaints. We found 
that the Negligibles had a rate of complaints per case heard of 
0.12% to 0.74%. The range of complaints per case for the Highs and 





 331. After consultation with the EOIR FOIA office, to hasten the agency response 
time, we limited our request for case load information for each anonymized IJ in the 
database to those described above. For the FOIA request and data, and the 
spreadsheet with our codes created from the FOIA data, see United States Citizens 
in Deportation Proceedings, DEPORTATION RESEARCH CLINIC, https://deportationres
earchclinic.org/USCData.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2019). The test of whether 
caseloads are driving the variation comes from asylum caseload data available after 
a private attorney using Adobe software deanonymized forty-six of the IJs in our 
database. Bryan Johnson, Secret Identities of Immigration Judges Revealed, 
AMOACHI & JOHNSON, PPLC ATTORNEYS AT LAW (Jan. 16, 2017), https://amjolaw.co
m/2017/01/16/secret-identities-of-immigration-judges-revealed/. We were thus able 
to create a dataset with asylum caseload, city, and background employment data for 
9 of the top offenders, or 57% of the Extremes, 44% of the Highs, 8% of the Middles, 
16% of the Lows, and 4% of the Negligibles. Using case load data on asylum 
proceedings, we found that while the Highs have a higher than average case load, 
the Extremes actually have a lower than average case load. We did not use regression 
analysis because we do not believe the data are sufficiently robust to credit 
representation that might convey objective, statistically significant inferences, 
though they are robust enough for purposes of hypothesis falsification. 
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Table II: IJ Complaints by Asylum Caseload 
 








Our analyses show no correlation between the average number of 
asylum cases and the number of misconduct complaints.332 The 
caseload of the Highs is 18% above the mean for all IJs, but the 
number of IJ misconduct complaints for the Highs is 227% of the 
mean for all IJs. In sum, the tests using EOIR data for 30 IJs and 
the asylum caseload data reveal that caseload is not accounting for 
the distribution of IJ complaints. 
ii. Agency Efficacy 
We were interested in assessing whether the misconduct 
complaint investigation process meaningfully advanced EOIR’s 
stated goals. First, we found an inverse or no relation between the 
number of complaints and the severity of the agency response.333 
Second, we observed a long delay between a complaint being filed 
and its investigation.334 A failure to address misconduct in real-time 
or close thereto is inconsistent with the stated objective of acquiring 
these complaints. Slow response times mean that additional 
complaints for similar behavior are likely to accrue. Third, we tested 
whether the complaint source was associated with the outcome and 
found that complaints generated by government employees were far 
more likely to elicit investigations and disciplinary responses than 
complaints from respondents, their attorneys, or third parties.335 
 
 332. See Ramji-Nogales, et al., supra note 138, at 326 (“The administrators in each 
immigration court assign cases to immigration judges to distribute the workload 
evenly among them, and without regard to the merits of the cases or the strength of 
defenses to removal that may be asserted by the respondents.”). 
 333. See supra Table I. 
 334. See infra Tables III, IV. 
 335. See infra Table VI. 
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The ACIJ Checklist (Checklist) for misconduct investigation 
training provides three possible supervisor responses to misconduct 
complaints: no response, training, or discipline.336 Of the 768 cases 
with discernible outcomes, only 22 (2.9%) closed with a response 
that was officially disciplinary. One IJ was terminated based on 
allegations unrelated to an immigration case complaint. Nine cases 
were closed with suspensions (1.2%) and twelve (1.6%) received 
written reprimands. No IJ was terminated based on allegations of 
improprieties in their handling of immigration cases. 
Thirty-six percent either were “dismissed” (n = 277) or closed 
with “oral counseling” (41%, n = 316), “written counseling” (6.3%, n 
= 49), or “training” (7.8%, n = 6).337 Sixty cases (15%) were 
“concluded” following nine IJs retiring or resigning, and thirty-six 
were “resolved” in association with findings from other cases.338 The 
concentration of complaints among repeat offenders and the lack of 
escalation, detailed in the third test below, suggests that EOIR’s 
low rate of disciplinary responses does not reduce IJ misconduct. 
Pursuant to EOIR’s statement about escalating responses for 
repeat offenders, one expects EOIR to respond especially quickly for 
complaints generated by those attracting prior complaints. This did 
not occur. We found that the average time between an underlying 
incident occurring and an ACIJ adding the complaint to the 








 336. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, ACIJ CHECKLIST FOR HANDLING 
COMPLAINTS AGAINST IJS 1 (2010), http://governmentillegals.org/ACIJChecklist-201
5-10218.pdf [hereinafter EOIR, ACIJ CHECKLIST]. For more information regarding 
FOIA Case No. 2015-10218, see Policies: Source Materials from Completed FOIA 
Requests, DEPORTATION RES. CLINIC, https://deportationresearchclinic.org/FOIA-Pol
icies.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2019). 
 337. Data on the final action in six cases is pending. 
 338. This figure represents the cases marked as “closed” because they are 
associated with IJs who retired. One IJ who retires may have numerous complaints 
in the database and they would all be listed as “closed” with no findings of culpability, 
although the retirement may reflect concerns about misconduct. 
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Table III: Days Elapsed Between Alleged 
Misconduct and Complaint Entered into Database, 
by IJ Complaint Frequency 







We also analyzed the average time between a complaint being 
investigated and a complaint being closed. The average number of 
days elapsed was 95 days, but for the Extremes, the average was 
240 days. Further, the average time between an incident occurring 
and the complaint investigation closing for the Extremes was over 
1,000 days.340 
 
Table IV: Average Time Elapsed between Complaint 
Received and Final Action 







In addition, ACIJs addressed multiple complaints in one oral 
or written counseling session and would conclude or dismiss more 
 
 339. Twenty-nine cases are missing the date of the alleged misconduct, either 
because it was not listed or there were multiple dates of misconduct referenced in 
the complaint. This figure is negative number of days because Complaint 12 was 
investigated before the initial complaint and second complaint about retaliation 
three months were entered into the database.  The first complaint was coded as 
“unsubstantiated” and there was no new case created or investigation of the second 
complaint of retaliation. 
 340. The mean number of days between an event occurring and a case closing was 
508 days (1.4 years). For the 754 complaints for which we have time data, 16 (2.1%) 
were closed in less than 30 days; 76 (10%) in more than 30 and less than 365 days; 
93 (36.6%) in more than 365 and less than 730 days; and 99 (13.1%) in more than 
730 days (2 years). 
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than one case the same date. Fourteen of the sixteen Extremes had 
more than one complaint closed on the same day. One of the 
Extremes, FRW, had eighteen cases closed with “termination.”341 
These results indicate the agency response time allowed multiple 
complaints to accrue before responding, and that the ACIJs and 
ACIJ C/P did not efficaciously address complaints. 
Complaints against the Extremes (twenty or more complaints) 
were less likely to be dismissed outright than those filed against 
other IJs, but they also elicited less discipline. IJs with fewer 
complaints were more likely to be suspended.342 Of the 16 IJs who 
received 10 or more complaints, 3 received 1 suspension each, 4-5 
years after the first complaint.343 Four IJs with 20 or more 
complaints received only non-disciplinary warnings of oral and 
written counseling, as did 8 of those with 10-19 complaints, 
including IJ Cassidy.344 Their recidivism suggests that the agency 














 341. These complaints for FRW are coded as “concluded - IJ termination during 
trial period made no action necessary.” This practice produces misleading EOIR 
descriptive data. EOIR’s “Immigration Judge Complaint Statistics” web page marks 
these cases simply as “Concluded,” obscuring the fact that 18 complaints were 
elicited for someone who was fired and whose misconduct subsequent to the 
offending incident might have been avoided had the agency addressed the complaints 
more promptly. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
COMPLAINTS AGAINST IMMIGRATION JUDGES 6 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/p
age/file/1100976/download. 
 342. Other adjudicators who received suspensions were coded as Middles: GNE, 
KSV, ANY, NHQ, ATX, GER. 
 343. See infra Table V. 
 344. Johnson, supra note 331. 
2019] The Case Against Absolute Judicial Immunity 379 
 
Table V: Disciplinary Responses by Number of Complaints 








Date of Last 
Complaint 
Entered in  
Database 
GEP E 8/4/12  15 5/1/09 7/8/13 
IQV E 3/1/11  25 4/24/09 5/14/13 
GOE H 12/8/10  13 11/25/08 5/7/12 
HKX E  1/20/06 31 11/6/08 5/3/11 
FRW H  12/22/08 18 9/1/08 10/6/10 
 
The fact that HKX had been recorded conspiring with an attorney 
to pursue a business relationship with a firm providing visas is 
further grounds for requiring a statement on the record in the 
presence of the observer stating specific, legal grounds for closing a 
hearing and an opportunity for the observer to object and appeal 
the order. Absolute judicial immunity effectively circumvents these 
protections and permits IJs such as HKX to pursue illicit deals with 
attorneys in secret.347 
 
 345. E means Extreme and H means High. 
 346. EOIR does not code “retirement” as a disciplinary response. See EXEC. 
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, COMPLAINTS AGAINST IMMIGRATION JUDGES, 
supra note 280 at 6.  HKX, an Extreme whose complaint investigations were closed 
by retirement, was identified as Dallas IJ Anthony Rogers, supra note 331. A 1998 
recording of Rogers bragging about a business relationship with an attorney 
practicing before him was obtained by then INS in 1998. Walter Roche, Immigration 
Judge Sought Business with Visa Vendors, BALTIMORE SUN (Jan. 10, 2003), 
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2003-01-10-0301100076-story.html (“A 
few months after the tape was made, on March 4, 1998, it was seized in a raid by 
INS investigators. Four years later, in a memo addressed to Joseph R. Greene, the 
assistant commissioner of the INS, an agency official complained that Rogers was 
still serving, despite a negative report on the incident by the inspector general of the 
Department of Justice… In the memo to Greene, the assistant INS commissioner, 
the conversation was described as an example of the ‘corrupting influence’ of the 
investor visa program. The memo stated that the taped conversation ‘reflects that 
the judge was not satisfied with Interbank's "typical immigration attorney deal,’ 
under which attorneys were paid up to $20,000 for each alien referred to Interbank; 
he also wanted ‘revenue at the back end.’ ‘Also discussed during the conversation 
were the judge's planned trip to Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and his ‘agency 
relationship  [with] some sheik," the memo continued."). 
 347. Pursuant to the effort to ban her, the Atlanta court administrator solicited a 
complaint against Stevens from an Atlanta attorney to whom Defendant Cassidy had 
recently referred a pro se respondent. Cassidy received “written counseling,” but no 
discipline. See Plaintiff’s Reply Brief in Support of Rule 60 Motion, at 6-7, Stevens v. 
Lynch, No. 1:12-CV-1352-ODE, 2016 WL 10950435 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 29, 2016) (No. 19-
1) (“In Complaint 164, the Board of Immigration Appeals admonishes Defendant 
Cassidy for violating a federal regulation on asylum records by sharing the file of an 
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iii. Final Action by Complaint Source 
In order for a government of the people and by the people to be 
effective, the guardians of the guardians need to be as responsive to 
complaints from respondents, their attorneys, or third parties, as 
when the guardians’ colleagues are aggrieved. This is particularly 
true in cases involving immigration and deportation policies. The 
ACIJs are more likely to substantiate allegations from government 
than non-government sources. This may mean the former are more 
likely to be accurate in their assessments of misconduct. But it also 
may mean that agency officials are disregarding bona fide 
misconduct complaints from fellow citizens. Information from the 
training manual itself suggests the latter may be occurring.348 
The Checklist is the training document on which ACIJs rely 
for intake and investigative response decisions.349 The Checklist 
includes of test cases drawn from actual complaints. One example 
references a letter signed by seventy detained respondents charging 
that the “Dallas IJs are engaged in racketeering by virtue of their 
setting high bonds and then profiting from the aliens’ continued 
detention via kickbacks from the owners of the detention 
centers.”350 The ACIJ C/P states that the complaint was “likely able 
to be closed as frivolous, merits-related, and unable to be 
substantiated; however the complainant probably did successfully 
state a claim.”351 According to the protocols, such allegations of 
 
asylum seeker with a private attorney. The transcript shows Defendant Cassidy 
referring a pro se respondent to the for-profit attorney without any representation 
that the assistance will be pro bono. The private attorney to whom Defendant 
Cassidy referred the respondent on December 10, 2009 happens to be the same 
attorney from whom Atlanta Court Administrator Defendant Cynthia Long on April 
14, 2010 solicited a complaint against Plaintiff . . . Defendant Cassidy appearing to 
steer business to the one private attorney of whom Defendants later requested a 
complaint suggests impropriety.”) (internal citations omitted). FRW (IJ Carey 
Holliday), was terminated on December 22, 2008, two years after his appointment, 
and after accumulating 18 complaints that all closed with no findings of 
improprieties and no discipline. Prior to being fired, he denied asylum to 662 
respondents of the 791 cases he heard. See IMMIGRATION JUDGE REPORTS, supra note 
329. 
 348. EOIR, ACIJ CHECKLIST, supra note 336. 
 349. EOIR, ACIJ CHECKLIST, supra note 336, at 1–3, 9–13, 15. 
 350. EOIR, ACIJ CHECKLIST, supra note 336, at 10–11. 
 351. EOIR, ACIJ CHECKLIST, supra note 336, at 11 (emphasis added). The 
training documents also include examples of conduct contemplated by the codes. For 
instance, the training materials specify “COV [change of venue]” as a “due process” 
violation. EOIR, ACIJ CHECKLIST, supra note 336, at 15. But on receiving a 
complaint “alleging multiple IJs’ improper denials of COV motions” and that “at least 
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criminal activity should have been forwarded to the DOJ Office of 
the Inspector General (OIG).352 Generally, the agency was more 
responsive to complaints from government officials than from 
others. Seventy-eight percent of complaints from non-government 
sources were dismissed, compared with 13% from the BIA, which 
generated the plurality of complaints, 17% from the DHS, and 22% 
from EOIR staff.353 
 
Table VI: Final Action by Complaint Source 
Complaint Source # of Complaints Corrective Response354 Disciplinary 
Response355 
Dismissed 
BIA 360 56% (202) 6% (21) 13% (47) 
Respondents/ 
Attorneys 212 26% (55) 2% (5) 78% (139) 
DHS 35 63% (22) 6% (2) 17% (6) 
EOIR 50 26% (13) 26% (13) 22% (11) 
Third Party 64 22% (14) 0% (0) 78% (50) 
iv. Data Limits 
Studies of misconduct complaints rely on data that have an 
unknown relation to the universe of actual misconduct. Several 
things may have distorted these reports. For example, intake 
supervisors may have protected some IJs and not others by not 
entering cases or by closing them as “unsubstantiated” without 
investigating them. Otherwise, IJs may have used intimidation or 
threats to discourage private practitioners from filing complaints. 
Attorneys in the American Immigration Law Association have 
reported that IJs in the Atlanta area filed cross-complaints against 
attorneys who reported IJ misconduct.356 An attorney in the Atlanta 
 
two Atlanta IJs” were “denying COVs where clearly warranted” the SACIJ coded and 
dismissed the complaint as merits-related. EOIR, ACIJ CHECKLIST, supra note 336, 
at 12. 
 352. EOIR, SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT PROCESS, supra note 318, at 1 n.2. 
 353. The large proportion of the total complaints emanating from the BIA likely 
is in response to the Gonzalez memorandum, which obligates these referrals. 
Gonzalez, Measures to Improve, supra note 309, at 7. 
 354. Corrective Response includes oral or written counseling and training. 
 355. Disciplinary Response includes written reprimand, suspension, termination, 
or resignation. 
 356. Correspondence on file with authors. 
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area filed a complaint against an IJ in our Highs reporting that the 
IJ (QJC) failed to record his own allegedly unprofessional comments 
during hearings. The complaint was affirmed but no action was 
taken, and the complaint is not in the misconduct database. On 
hearing of the initial complaint, QJC filed a cross complaint that 
was never closed, despite repeated efforts on the part of the 
attorney, whose name was on a list of those “under investigation.” 
“I was on permanent probation,” the attorney stated.357 He believed 
additional complaints about this IJ would cause further 
retaliation.358 
Furthermore, the ratio of complaints per caseload may 
understate the rate of IJ misconduct. This is because caseloads may 
not be exogenous to IJ temperament. Two IJs who received 
persistent and serious verified misconduct complaints—but 
attracted little or no discipline in Atlanta (PBZ and QJC)—invoked 
their “mass removal” hearings to rationalize their actions.359 ACIJ 
supervisors may overlook misconduct in exchange for these IJs 
keeping pace with the dockets generated by DHS, a major priority 
for an agency that has attracted front page headlines and 
Congressional scrutiny for its notoriously large case backlog.360 
Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions further incentivized a fast 
pace of hearings by implementing case quotas.361 
 
 357. The attorney who described the failures in recording shared this with the co-
author only after he retired and on conditions of confidentiality. Interview (June 22, 
2009) (on file with authors). 
 358. Id. 
 359. See Jacqueline Stevens, New FOIA Documents: EOIR Performance Awards 
and Raises for 2008-2010, STATES WITHOUT NATIONS (Oct. 20, 2010), https://statesw
ithoutnations.blogspot.com/2010/10/new-foia-documents-eoir-performance.html; see 
also Jacqueline Stevens, “PBZ” (aka J. Dan Pelletier?) Reveals Atlanta IJs WERE 
Using Boilerplate [and Incorrect] IRS Analyses, STATES WITHOUT NATIONS (June 18, 
2016), http://stateswithoutnations.blogspot.com/2016/06/pbz-aka-j-dan-pelletier-rev
eals-atlanta.html. 
 360. Congressional and Executive frustration with EOIR’s backlog has been a 
longstanding issue. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-438, IMMIGRATION 
COURTS: ACTIONS NEEDED TO REDUCE CASE BACKLOG AND ADDRESS LONG-STANDING 
MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES (2017), http://www.gao.gov/products/
GAO-17-438. For more information on backlog data, see Immigration Court Backlog 
Tool, TRAC IMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/ 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2019). 
 361. Joel Rose, Justice Department Rolls out Quotas for Immigration Judges, NPR 
(Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/03/599158232/justice-department-rolls-
out-quotas-for-immigration-judges/. 
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The OIG “found that immigration court performance reports 
are incomplete and overstate the actual accomplishments of these 
courts.”362 The fact that the OIG would flag EOIR’s overstatement 
of its case completions on the first page of its report suggests that 
the agency may value a high rate of case completions more than 
requiring due process for its hearings. A system that rewards the 
individual and the agency for high completion rates and has no 
other measures of performance is inconsistent with expecting the 
agency to meaningfully review complaints about IJ misconduct, or, 
more importantly, to forward them to either the DOJ Office of 
Professional Responsibility or OIG. Quantitative performance goals 
for the agency that work their way through the bureaucracy may 
explain why agency officials tolerate repeat offender misconduct 
without escalating disciplinary responses, as well as why certain 
Extremes or Highs have large caseloads.363 
Conclusion 
This Article analyzes government operations, administrative 
decisions, and court orders associated with federal officials 
obstructing access to immigration hearings to engage a more 
general political problem. The specific question of whether federal 
judges may create a so-called inherent judicial power for IJs who, 
for unlawful reasons, prohibit the public from observing hearings 
engages the importance to democracy of statutory constraints on 
the exercise of authority by government officials. We sought in this 
Article to tie the contemporary deficiencies of immigration courts in 
general to court-crafted exceptions to due process principles for 
policies advanced in the name of “the nation” or national security.364 
We then reviewed the history of statutes defining and constraining 
the prerogatives of special inquiry and, later, immigration hearing 
officers or IJs. We also sought to demonstrate the substantive 
importance of hearing access in light of the life-and-death stakes of 
these hearings, the public’s ignorance of these proceedings, and, 
 
 362. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MANAGEMENT OF 
IMMIGRATION CASES AND APPEALS BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION 
REVIEW, at i (2012), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2012/e1301.pdf/. 
 363. For an explanation of the benefit of focusing on extreme cases, see JASON 
SEAWRIGHT, MULTI-METHOD SOCIAL SCIENCE: COMBINING QUALITATIVE AND 
QUANTITATIVE TOOLS 117 (2016) (“[T]he best alternatives for finding omitted 
variables involve choosing cases that are extreme on the outcome variable . . . .”). 
 364. See supra, note 3 and the Introduction more generally. 
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finally, the deficiencies of the agency’s own efforts at responding to 
allegations of IJ misconduct. Since the Presidential election of 2016, 
the actions of political appointees diminishing IJ discretion have 
become more obvious,365 and the need for public access to hearings, 
commensurately, has become more pressing.366 By acting on the 
statutory authority to overturn orders of the BIA and issue new 
opinions that are binding on IJs, the DOJ is further concretizing the 
political nature the EOIR. On top of the control of IJ and BIA 
hirings and firings, salaries, and working conditions, the Attorneys 
General in the Trump administration are mandating IJs to issue 
decisions that conform with specific and legally dubious 
interpretations of the law by political appointees.367 Such 
pronouncements underscore the extent to which IJs are 
indistinguishable from other employees of the federal government 
who are implementing policies based on party or candidate 
 
 365. In Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 320 (A.G. 2018), for example, Trump-
appointee Attorney General Sessions took jurisdiction of an asylum case and used it 
as the occasion for overturning a 2014 precedential decision of the BIA. (“Generally, 
claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-
governmental actors will not qualify for asylum.”). Then, in Matter of M-S-, 27 I&N 
Dec. 509, 510 (A.G. 2019), Attorney General Barr overturned a 2005 order and 
prohibited IJs from releasing asylum-seekers from custody (“The respondent here 
was transferred from expedited to full proceedings after establishing a credible fear, 
and an immigration judge ordered his release on bond. Because the respondent is 
ineligible for bond under the Act, I reverse the immigration judge’s decision.”). 
 366.   A further concern is that the ACIJ who supervised the ineffective 
misconduct investigations described in this study has been promoted to Chief 
Immigration Judge.   Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, DEP’T HOMELAND 
SECURITY, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge-bios 
(last visited May 31, 2019). MaryBeth Keller now “establishes operating policies and 
oversees policy implementation for the immigration courts.”  Id. Keller is the ACIJ 
who dismissed as “frivolous” a complaint about Dallas IJ corruption, even though 
then INS had a recording of the IJ seeking business ties with a firm that handles 
business visas. See supra note 347. 
 367. Catherine Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 22 
(2018) (“Attorney General Jeff Sessions has addressed these courts repeatedly to 
emphasize the President’s policy priorities. In remarks during the EOIR’s Legal 
Training Program, he asserted, ‘[a]ll of us should agree that, by definition, we ought 
to have zero illegal immigration in this country,’ and reminded IJs in attendance 
that they are required to ‘conduct designated proceedings “subject to such 
supervision and shall perform such duties as the Attorney General shall prescribe.”’ 
To that end, the Administration has instituted wide-ranging reforms, eliminating 
the power of IJs to grant ‘administrative closure’ in cases; altering the procedures 
and standards for considering asylum claims; purporting to prohibit the release of 
detained aliens; and implementing a series of managerial reforms including an 
ambitious hiring initiative, the introduction of performance metrics, and additional 
supervisory measures to ensure that the decisions of immigration judges conform to 
the President’s immigration agenda.”). 
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preferences. To the extent that IJs appointments reflect the political 
preferences of the party or candidate occupying the White House, 
bestowing absolute immunity to IJs who may be political cronies 
enables demonstrably partisan—and not discretionary judicial 
conduct—to occur in secret hearings. 
Decisions are being made increasingly in coordination with the 
Attorney General and even the arresting agency DHS.368 Moreover, 
Trump IJ appointees will soon comprise a plurality of all IJs. As 
such, it is not just legally but politically imperative to ensure that 
such officials and their proceedings are subject to the observation of 
third parties, including students, scholars, the media, and, 
especially, concerned U.S. citizens and taxpayers. Section 1003.28  
of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations exists to protect the 
proper functioning of democracy and the rule of law. Any unlawful 
restrictions on the mandate for open hearings—including the 
deprivation of any remedy to its violation through Court-created 
absolute judicial immunity—violates the principles of Bivens and 
the rule of law more generally. 
 
 
 368. The DHS has been limiting asylum claims at ports of entry and the DOJ 
ordered IJs to deny bond to those who did not make these at a port of entry. The 
result is a lack of immigration court “independence” and “impartiality.” See Letter 
from 55 Members of Congress to Attorney General Barr (May 15, 2019), https://ww
w.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbeddedFile/80226. 
